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– Leading position in the US and Europe: WW is
the market leader in the US weight-management
services market. Moreover, the company has a
strong presence in Continental Europe and UK
– Strong recent performance explained by the
implementation of the Transformation Plan:
WW’s EBITDA margin is substantially higher
than its peers and EBITDA has grown at a higher
rate in the recent years. This was sustained by
revamping its points program, improving its
mobile/digital platforms and the partnership
with Oprah, which allowed for increases in
recruitment and retention
– Robust cash flow generation: strong
operational performance in 2016-2018 coupled
with the high fixed costs and low CAPEX nature
of the business yielded a 135% increase in FCF
– Solid growth prospects: the global weight-
management market is forecasted to grow at a
8.3% CAGR (2018-2025), driven primarily by the
increase in obesity levels and the prevalence of
lifestyle diseases. WW has ample opportunities
for growth, particularly in the high margin online
segment, in B2B and in largely untapped
demographics such as men and young women
How will value be captured?How will value be created?Why is WW a good deal?
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– The company will be acquired at an
EV/(EBITDA-Cap. Software Exp.) multiple of
13.5x, corresponding to an EV of $5,573mn
– Equity and Debt will fund 61.2% and 38.8% of the
acquisition, respectively
– Value Creation Strategies: (I) grow the B2C
services segment, focusing on improving
retention and acquisition rates; (II) implement a
B2B strategy, establishing partnerships with
corporations; (III) reformulate product
offering, introducing faster-growing categories
like organic, naturally-healthy or free-from; and
(IV) acquire Nutrisytem to enter the ready
meals market and solidify its position in the core
geography, being able to generate synergies
(selling WW-branded ready meals through
Nutrisystem’s capabilities)
– EBITDA is forecasted to be 120% higher in 2023
than in 2018, primarily due to growth in the B2C
services segment (driven by high acquisition
rates and low churn rates; and by margin
expansion, due to the shift to the higher-margin
online business and to high operating leverage).
Nutrisystem’s acquisition also contributes
significantly, but is not paramount for the deal
– Exit strategy: Given WW’s size at the time of exit, an IPO
would be a likely scenario. Alternatively, the company
could be sold to a strategic buyer such as Nestlé, Unilever
or Kraft Heinz, which have invested significantly in the
Health and Wellness space
– Returns: No multiple arbitrage is assumed, and the deal
yields a money multiple of 2.92x for the fund and ~5.59x
for the management team. Revenue growth is the major
driver of value creation, being mostly explained by
Nutrisystem’s acquisition and growth in the online segment
Investment Thesis
Company & Market Overview
• Company Overview
• Market Overview
• Historic Financials
– WW operates through a network of
company-owned and franchise operations,
servicing four geographic segments: North
America –US and Canada –, United
Kingdom, Continental Europe –Germany,
Switzerland, France, Belgium, Netherlands
and Sweden – and Other – Australia, New
Zeeland and worldwide franchises
– North America has been the key market
for WW, accounting for ~70% of sales in
2017
– Operations in Spain ceased in the first
quarter of 2017, whereas operations in
Mexico ceased in the first quarter of 2018
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– Revenue: $1,537mn (+18% vs. ‘17)
– EBITDA: $457mn (+43% vs. ‘17)
– Op Income: $418mn (+56% vs. ‘17)
– Net Income: $204mn (+18% vs. ‘17)
– FCF: $200 mn (+10% vs. ‘17)
Revenue % per geography (2017)
North America: 69.7%    Continental 
Europe:18.3%    UK: 7.6%    Other: 4.4% 
– Corporate HQs: New York, US 
– Number of Workers: 18,000 (Dec. 
2018)
– EOP* Meeting Subscribers (2018):  
1.36mn (+8.7% vs. ‘17)
– EOP Online Subscribers (2018):  
2.71mn (+38% vs. ‘17)
Geographic Presence
Description
Company Profile & History High Level Financials (2018e)
*EOP – End of the Period
WW (formerly Weight Watchers) is a U.S. wellness company and 
the leading provider of weight management services
1963The company was founded 
by Jean Nidetch, a Brooklyn 
homemaker
The company went public, 
after a successful 5-year 
period
WW was acquired by H. J. 
Heinz Company
1968
1978 WW’s fortunes began to 
change when it introduced 
1-2-3 Success, the first 
point-based diet plan
Heinz sold WW’s core 
business to Artal
International S.C.A, retaining 
ownership of WW’s line of 
frozen foods, desserts, and 
breakfast products
The company went public 
again
In the early 2010s, sales  
declined steeply, driven 
by: the emergence of free 
diet/ fitness apps; WW 
missing the broader 
consumer shift to online; 
and the fact that WW was 
perceived as just a diet plan 
company
2015 Transformation 
Plan improved results, by 
rebranding WW, revamping 
its points program 
(introduction of 
SmartPoints), improving its 
mobile/digital platforms 
and recruiting pivotal 
influencers, namely Oprah 
Winfrey
1997
1999
2001
2012
2015
WW is a well-established US wellness company and the leading weight-management
services provider, being present in most developed economies
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Roughly 90% of WW members are
female and the distribution is skewed
towards Caucasian women around 50
years old (average online member
skews closer to 40)
Females aged 18-34 correspond only to
~17% of subscriber base and ~33% of
the subscribers are international
In the 2013-2017 period, growth was
mainly driven by online subscriber
acquisition
Average subscriber retention has
historically been ~8.4 months. In the
last year, retention began sharply
rising, reaching ~9.85 months in 2Q18
WW’s sales are seasonal, with ~40% of
new joiners entering the program
during 1Q, typically related to New
Year’s resolutions
0
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2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
EOP subscribers (mn)
Meeting Online
Customers
WW sells complementary products,
including bars, snacks, cookbooks, food and
restaurant guides with SmartPoints values,
magazines and certain third-party products.
The company also licenses its trademarks in
some consumer products categories
WW provides weight-management programs,
being WW Freestyle the most recent one
(2017). WW Freestyle relies on a point-based
dieting plan which encourages healthier food
choices at appropriate portions, focusing more
on the nutritional “value” than on calories
WW Freestyle redefined 200 common foods as
'zero point' foods, making it significantly easier
for subscribers to adapt the WW’s points system
to everyday eating habits
WW’s programs are commercialized through 2
channels: in-group meetings and online
subscription plans (any of them has an initiation
fee of $20). All subscribers are given access to
WW’s app, which allows them to: scan barcodes
for their SmartPoints values, engage with other
users and receive/provide support through the
Connect feature
Core Business
Secondary Businesses
“Summer of Impact Campaign” was launched,
through digital and TV advertising in 2018, to
smooth seasonality. Campaign encourages people
to be healthy year-round, not just following New
Year’s resolutions
Influencer Advertising spurs new customer
growth. WW entered into a 5-year advertising
partnership with Oprah Winfrey in October 2015.
Kate Hudson joined as a celebrity ambassador in
2018. Furthermore, campaigns featuring male
brand ambassadors, such as DJ Khaled and Kevin
Smith, have slightly fomented this demographic
group member base
Marketing Strategies
Ongoing rebranding efforts: reposition the company
as a wellness & lifestyle brand, instead of a pure
weight-loss services provider (e.g.: launch of Beyond
the Scale program, introduction of SmartPoints, the
1st point system which no longer considered calories
as the primary deciding factor in determining the
point value for food, and changing company name
from Weight Watchers to WW with the motto
“Wellness that Works”)
Focus on community support increases retention
rates as the successful integration of the “Connect”
social platform into the broader WW ecosystem has
improved customer experience
Business Model
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WW’s offer relies on a point-based dieting plan which is advertised by celebrities like 
Oprah and attracts mainly middle-aged women
22.24%
12.82%
8.13%
6.87%3.44%
46.50%
Artal International
Fidelity Company
Oprah Winfrey
The Vanguard Group
BlackRock
Others
Top Management Profiles*
WW has a diverse and qualified team comprised by professionals with significant experience in
industries such as retail, consumer products, apparel and lifestyle products, experts on obesity,
behaviour change, and technology. The current team was assembled in recent years in order to
reposition the brand as a wellness & lifestyle brand, which explains the short tenure at the company
Management Team
The graph represents the Top 5 shareholders (August, 2018)
– As of August 16, 2018, Artal International S. C. A. , the
largest shareholder, owns approximately 22.24% of
outstanding common stock, having sold 6,000,000 shares
of common stock (~9% of outstanding common stock) in a
block trade at a price of $76.00 per share
– In 2015, Ms. Winfrey received 10% of WW shares and
an option to buy an incremental 5% of the stock,
exercisable at $6.97/share, in exchange for her
cooperation with the company . Since then, Ms. Winfrey
has sold some shares, now owning ~8% of the stock with
sales related to estate planning purposes. This strategic
alliance is a key asset for WW given not only MS.
Winfrey’s marketing clout, but also her network of
influential senior leaders across companies in the US,
which may make it easier for WW to develop further
strategic partners
– 82.47% of shares are held by Institutions and 9.27% by
insiders
88% 58% 25%
Older than 50                                          Female                                  Over 5 years with WW
Ownership Structure
President & CEO: Mindy Grossman, 60
– Took over as CEO in July 2017. Previously, Mrs. Grossman served as Chief Executive
Officer of HSN, Inc., a multichannel retailer of fashion, household and lifestyle
products; and held various executive positions at Nike, Ralph Lauren and Tommy
Hilfiger
– Education: B.A. (The George Washington University)
CFO & Emerging Markets President: Nicholas P. Hotchkin, 52
– Has served as WW’s CFO since 2012. Previously, Mr. Hotchkin served as a Senior
Vice-President of Finance at Staples, Inc. and held several corporate finance
positions with Delphi Corporation and General Motors Corporation
– Education: B.A. in Economics and M.B.A. (Harvard Business School)
"The world doesn't need another diet. The world needs a leader in wellness and a brand that 
can bring wellness to everyone, not just a few“ – Mindy Grossman, President & CEO
*For additional information, see Attachment 1
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WW has a highly qualified and experienced management team implementing a 
rebranding strategy and ownership has become more diluted
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Revenues from Meetings Revenues from Product Sales and OtherRevenues from Online Subscriptions
– Having grown at a 17.8% CAGR in 2015-2018
period, these plans provide interactive and
personalized resources that allow users to follow
WW’s weight management program via web-based
and mobile app products. There are 2 online
subscription models: the digital/OnlinePlus plan
(standard monthly fee = $19.95/month) – which
gives access to food & activity tracking, to the
Connect feature and to a 24/7 expert online chat –
and coaching ($54.95/ month), – which, besides
these features, offers unlimited phone sessions with
a dedicated coach and personalized plans and skills
training. For digital/OnlinePlus, 3-month and 6-
month discounted commitment plans are offered as
an alternative payment structure
– Costs are associated with running and maintaining
WW’s digital platforms but also Experts and
Coaches’ compensation
– Having grown at a 6.9% CAGR in
2015-2018 period, WW’s meeting
plan ($44.95/month) encompasses
all the features of OnlinePlus,
additionally providing access to
weekly meetings (30-45 minutes),
where participants learn through
member-driven discussion and
individual goal-setting. Each meeting
has a “leader”, a part-time (not
certified) WW employee who is
responsible for coordinating the
sessions, educating members on the
program and its range of tools
– Costs are associated with operating
meetings, including meeting room
rent and leaders’ compensation
– Product sales and other grew at a 3.0% in 2015-2018
period and comprises products sales (~35% gross margin)
and Licensing, franchise royalties and others (~55% gross
margin)
– WW commercializes a range of consumer products (mostly
reduced fat food), including bars, snacks, cookbooks, food
and restaurant guides with SmartPoints values and
magazines. Non-members can also buy these products using
WW’s e-commerce platforms
– WW licenses its trademarks and other intellectual property
in certain food, beverages and other consumer products and
services, which are helpful to weight- and health-conscious
consumers. It also endorses selected branded consumer
products and services. In its early years, WW used an
aggressive franchising strategy to quickly establish a meeting
infrastructure to pre-empt competition. Since then, WW has
acquired many franchises. The remaining franchisees pay
royalties of 10% of meeting fee revenues as well as purchase
products for sale
Share of Revenues
37%
Share of Revenues
47%
Share of Revenues
16%
Gross Margin (%)
82%
Gross Margin (%)
43%
Gross Margin (%)
43%
Revenues (~$1.54bn) and Gross Margins (~57.5%) in 2018
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Margins will continue to expand following the shift from Meetings to Online 
Subscriptions, the segment with the highest gross margin
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Historically, WW’s marketing expenses have been concentrated in the 1st
quarter, given consumer's propensity to start diets and resolutions at the
beginning of the year (e.g., in FY17, 43% of marketing expenses occurred in
Q1). Despite the increasing reliance on the online segment, WW’s marketing
mix has not been focused on the digital channel – UBS estimates that only 20%
to 30% of its marketing expense in 2017 was digital
The average marketing expense per new subscriber – subscriber acquisition
cost was estimated by Morgan Stanley to be around $40 in 2017 and to
normalize over the following years, which makes customer base growth a
great opportunity for the company as customer lifetime value – average
revenue per customer during its retention period – was around $264
SG&A expenses have remained
virtually unchanged, despite
changes in the number of
subscribers. These costs
include, among others,
corporate compensation,
facility costs, depreciation and
amortization of systems in
support of the business
infrastructure, and audit, legal
and litigation expenses
Interest expenses decreased during
the 2015-2017 period. Prior to
refinancing its debt in November
2017, WW was paying approximately
$27-$28 million in quarterly interest
payments. In 1Q18, its interest
expense was nearly $36 million, an
amount which UBS estimates to
remain steady throughout FY18 and
which is consistent with the
company's guidance of $144 million in
interest expense in 2018
As a % of Revenues
15%
* One-time costs (~1% of total costs ) were not considered in this analysis; Depreciation is incorporated in Cost of Revenues and SG&A expenses
WW has high operating leverage, resulting in low incremental cost to serve additional customers (e.g., in 2018, operating leverage was 3.0 as
revenues increased by 18% but EBIT jumped 33.5%). Fixed costs include rent/overhead, meeting room supplies, base salaries, technology, product and
content, whereas variable costs only account for commissions, product materials, customer care and other small costs
SG&A expenses Interest expensesMarketing expenses
Other Costs* (~$0.6bn) in 2018
As a % of Revenues
16%
As a % of Revenues
9%$264$40
Customer Acquisition 
Cost (‘17)
Average Customer 
Lifetime Value (‘17)
vs.
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High operating leverage provides a significant incentive to grow customer base, as 
marginal costs are significantly lower than marginal revenues
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– From 2013 to 2015, revenues decreased across all segments.
Stronger competition and difficulty from the company to adapt to
changes in consumer needs and the online shift drove WW to
respond, implementing the Transformation Plan in 2015
– Following this plan, subscriber recruitment and retention
improved significantly, leading to the increase in revenues in all
segments, specially in the online segment. North America and
Continental Europe were the fastest-growing regions in this period
– WW’s high operating leverage nature makes EBITDA very
dependent on revenues volume (i.e., when revenues increase by
1%, EBITDA grows by more than 1% and vice-versa)
– Marketing expenses decreased until 2016, resulting from the
Oprah agreement and the integration of TV spots
– WW also made efforts to adopt cost-saving initiatives in SG&A,
including rationalization of its workforce and reduction of its total
payroll. After 2016, as performance improved, SG&A expenses
grew as a result of higher compensation and incentives
– Cost of revenues decreased until 2016, when the trend reverted as
revenues increased. However, cost of revenues did not vary as
much as revenues, since some of these costs are fixed
– In the 2013-2015 period, gross profit and gross margin declined as
costs did not decrease as much as revenues. After that, gross
margin and gross profit increased as the company enjoys from
relatively high operating leverage and could increase quantities,
while the company was shifting from meetings to the higher-
margin online segment
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Given the nature of its high operating leverage business, after 2015 WW was able revert 
disappointing profitability results, by serving more people
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($ mn) 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Revenues 1,724 1,480 1,164 1,165 1,307 1,537 
% Growth -6% -14% -21% 0% 12% 18%
Services 1,374 1,182 937 949 1,082 1,289 
Meetings 852 745 588 605 665 717 
% Growth -9% -13% -21% 3% 10% 8%
Online 522 437 350 344 417 571 
% Growth 4% -16% -20% -2% 21% 37%
Product Sales & Other 350 298 227 216 225 248 
Cost of revenues (723) (677) (590) (579) (614) (653)
Meetings N/A N/A (388) (386) (402) (409)
Gross Margin N/A N/A 34% 36% 40% 43%
Online N/A N/A (89) (83) (84) (103)
Gross Margin N/A N/A 74% 76% 80% 82%
Product Sales & Other (165) (142) (112) (111) (128) (141)
Gross Margin 53% 52% 50% 49% 43% 43%
Gross Profit 1,001 803 574 585 693 884 
% Growth -9% -20% -28% 2% 18% 28%
Gross Margin (%) 58% 54% 49% 50% 53% 58%
Operating Expenses (540) (503) (406) (385) (425) (474)
% of Revenues 31% 34% 35% 33% 33% 31%
Marketing Expenses (296) (262) (201) (194) (201) (236)
% Revenues 17% 18% 17% 17% 15% 15%
SG&A (245) (241) (205) (190) (211) (238)
% of Revenues 14% 16% 18% 16% 16% 16%
Other Operating Expenses 0 0 0 0 (13) 0
% of Revenues 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0%
EBITDA* 505 349 221 253 319 448 
% Growth -8% -31% -37% 15% 26% 41%
EBITDA Margin (%) 29% 24% 19% 22% 24% 29%
* WW includes depreciation in the cost of revenues, being added back in order to calculate EBITDA
WW has been capable of growing its Operating Cash Flow throughout the past three years due to
the significant increase in net income, which, in turn, was primarily driven by EBITDA growth.
During the same period, Capital Expenditure increased slightly, while Capital Software Expenditure
suffered a minor decrease after a big investment to revamp the mobile app in 2014/2015. WW can
be characterized as a low CAPEX business but one that requires considerable investment in
Marketing (as seen before) and Software Innovation. Operational performance has improved the
company’s Cash Conversion Ratio
WW enjoys from higher and faster-growing EBITDA margins than its peers but could
not grow Revenues as much as them, which makes revenue growth one of the biggest
focus for the company to further improve profitability, also combined with its high
operating leverage nature
On the last day of 2018, WW valuation multiple EV/EBITDA was 9.0x, which makes its
valuation look relatively cheap, compared to its peers, despite the fact that the
company’s EBITDA margin is higher and has allowed higher EBITDA growth
Robust Cash Flow generation and deleveraging
Strong EBITDA generation compared to peers
In 2017, WW extended the maturity of its overall debt with the
repayment of a term loan set to expire in 2020 and the issuance of a
new term loan due in 2024. Further, it replaced a $50mn revolver with
a $150mn revolver. Finally, it also issued $300mn in senior notes. By
the end of 2017, around 84% of the debt held by WW in 2017 ($1,865
mn) was linked to interest rate indices (managed with interest rate
swaps) - and 7% ($123mn) was linked to a revolving credit facility.
Leverage peaked at 8.3x net debt / EBITDA in 2015, but strong
EBITDA (and consequently FCF) growth combined with consistent
debt paydown since then has resulted in meaningful deleverage
through 2018. EBITDA growth is expected to remain the primary
driver for WW deleveraging
** Peers considered were Medifast, Nutrisystem and Herbalife Nutrition
($
 m
n
)
* Cash Conversion Ratio = OCF/EBITDA
0
300
0.0x
6.0x
12.0x
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Net Debt / EBITDA FCF
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Strong cash flow generation has given room for deleveraging, while the company is more 
profitable than its peers and sees potential to grow faster
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($ mn) 2016 2017 2018
EBITDA 253 319 448 
Depreciation & 
Amortization
(53) (51) (39)
Interest Expenses (115) (113) (144)
Taxes (17) 18 (61)
Net Income 69 173 204
($ mn) 2016 2017 2018
Operating Cash Flow 119 222 253 
[Cash conversion 
ratio*]
47% 70% 56%
CAPEX (6) (14) (18)
Capital. Software Exp. (29) (27) (35)
FCF 85 181 200
3Y Revenue 
CAGR
3Y EBITDA 
CAGR
2018 EBITDA 
Margin
3Y Avg.
EV/EBITDA
WW 9.7% 27.3% 29.7% 11.3x
Average peer** 13.2% 18.9% 15.6% 13.4x
WW’s 
SAM
$18b
Market Size
The Global Health & Wellness Market, a broad definition of WW’s Total Addressable
Market (TAM), is valued at $3.7tn and is expected to grow at a CAGR of 5.9% between
2018 and 20261. Narrowing the scope, it is possible to define the Global Weight
Management Market, which includes healthy meals and beverages, diet supplements,
weight management services and workout equipment, as the company’s TAM
The Global Weight Management amounted to $214.7bn2 in 2016. North America was the
largest regional market (45%), followed by Europe (23%), Asia Pacific (22%), Latin
America (7%) and MEA (3%). In the 2018-2025 period, the market is forecasted to grow
at a 8.3% value CAGR, with the Asia Pacific region accounting for the fastest growth during
the forecast period
WW’s Serviceable Addressable Market (SAM) is within the Global Weight Management
Market, being mostly focused on the US Weight Loss Market – despite ongoing rebranding
initiatives, WW is still mainly focused on weight-loss. This SAM is estimated to be worth
$18bn, addressing roughly 50mn subscribers – for additional information, see
Attachment 2
Market Overview
66%7%
6%
21%
Core Market
Men
Young
International
Core Market refers to
middle-to-older aged
women (35-64) in the
US who are either
overweight / obese or
are actively trying to
control their weight
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WW could potentially reach approximately 50 million subscribers, a market that is 
worth $18bn
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Obesity levels
Prevalence of lifestyle 
diseases
Real disposable 
income
Growth Drivers Impact
– In recent years, cardiovascular diseases and diabetes were, respectively, the 1st and 7th top causes of death in the US
– The total number of people with diabetes is forecasted to increase from 30.3mn (9.2 % of U.S. population) to 54.9mn (13.9%
of U.S. population) in 2030
Attitude towards 
weight management 
and  healthier living
Shift from offline to 
online
Popularity of 
subscription-based 
models
– In the 2000-2015 period, obesity prevalence increased significantly across all age demographics
– In 2015-16, the prevalence of obesity was higher among middle-aged adults (43%) than among younger adults (36%)
– Overall obesity prevalence rate is estimated to reach 42% by 2030
– Real personal disposable income per capita has experienced a 9.7% increase in the 2013-2017 period, having risen from
$39,763 to $42,791
– In recent years, there has been an upsurge in the quantity of available subscription services, notably in media streaming (e.g.:
Netflix and Spotify). There are other categories that support the subscription based model, including Meal Kits (e.g.: Blue
Apron), Home Service (e.g.: Handy) and Beauty Products (e.g.: Birchbox)
– Advances in technology, logistics, payments and trust, combined with the increasing internet and mobile access, and consumer
demand for convenience and flexibility have lead to shift from offline to online commerce
– This broad trend has also affected the weight loss & management market, as evidenced by the emergence of new competitors
such as MyFitnessPal. WW is well positioned to benefit from this trend, having a strong online presence
– Since 2000, the percentage of people who want to lose weight has remained stable (between 50% and 60%)
– The percentage of people who want to maintain their current weight has also remained stable (30%-40%)
– The share of American consumers who have changed their attitude on healthier living in the past 5 years is virtually unchanged
Description*
– Several of the most important players in the food and beverage market, including Nestle, Unilever, Danone, General Mills and
even Coca-Cola have been making various investments in the health and wellness space, in an attempt to meet customer trends.
This could potentially decrease the demand for WW’s consumer products
Competition from food 
and beverage giants
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*For additional information, see Attachment 3
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WW’s core US market is expected to grow, driven primarily by the upsurge in obesity 
levels and the increasing prevalence of lifestyle diseases
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Other commercial 
weight-loss programs
Self-help materials
Performance levels in customer perspective*
Price Concept broadness Convenience Efficacy
– Customers look for products or services that are as inexpensive, convenient/easy to use and effective producing results as possible (with scientific proof of
success), while allowing them to experience a broad approach to achieve a healthy lifestyle, rather than just losing weight
WW’s services ($20-$55/
month) are substantially
cheaper than other
weight-loss programs
(~$300/ month), but
those are mostly meal
replacement plans, which
reduce groceries
expenses. Self-help
materials are free or
relatively cheap
Despite the rebranding
efforts, WW is still seen
as a weight loss
company, just like other
commercial programs. On
the other hand, self-help
materials display content
in many lifestyle areas,
though very few of them
aggregate features
WW has an easy to use
and functional app, a
wide meeting centres’
network and its diets
offer more flexibility for
customers’ choices;
however, it does not
offer the convenience of
delivering ready meals
at client’s homes like
most of the other
commercial programs
Several studies prove
the efficacy of WW’s
programs and other
commercial programs, in
opposition to self-help
materials. Long-lasting
strong track record and
community support help
making customers
perceive WW’s efficacy as
slightly higher
WW does not have a clear competitive advantage. This could be achieved by continuing the rebranding efforts (to become a lifestyle company),
offering more convenience (e.g., by also delivering ready meals at home) and reinforcing its program’s efficacy in marketing initiatives. However,
WW is still able to distinguish itself from the direct competitors since its app is considered superior, relying on an efficient point-based diet plan
which motivates subscribers and its community support and the inherent collaboration are very important assets for the company
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Offering broader lifestyle solutions and more convenience is paramount
to gain competitive advantage over its direct competitors
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– WW is mostly threatened by its direct competitors (other commercial weight-loss programs and self-help materials). In Attachment 4 it can be concluded that
WW performs equally or better than the remaining substitute products/services (fitness centres, doctors/nutritionists, surgical procedures and supplements/diet
pills/shakes) in all the major performance drivers
* For additional information, see Attachment 4
• Value creation strategies
• Market Share gain
• Internationalization
• Buy-and-build
• Business Plan forecast
Value creation & Business Plan
Currently, WW is present in most developed countries. Expansion to underdeveloped
markets could make sense in the business perspective, as countries like Mexico and India
show changes in attitudes towards weight management and high obesity/overweight
levels. However, following a PE rationale, entering in these markets would represent
a significant investment (of capital and time), whereas return is unpredictable (e.g.,
WW is struggling with its Brazilian operations and unsuccessfully tried to enter the
Mexican market in the past). Therefore, as there is still value to create and solidify in
current markets, it is believed that WW should hold back on possible expansion plans,
leaving this opportunity to be explored by future target buyers in 5-7 years
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Leverage on services
Providing counselling, encouraging
community support and engaging with
subscribers in innovative ways is the core
business of the company. Due to the high
operating leverage of its core business, it is
paramount to increase revenues, which will
have a positive impact on EBITDA margin
Expand the products segment
Current product offering is considered to be
insufficient to cater customers trends, mainly
in terms of product categories and
convenience. It only represents 11% of WW’s
revenues and there is potential to capture
more value from the food consumption
stage of the customer journey
Grow B2C
While the company will continue observing a shift from meetings to online, it
should focus on acquisition and retention to improve top and bottom line results
Improve 
customer 
attraction and 
retention
Establish 
partnerships 
with 
corporations
Hold back on 
possible 
expansion 
plans
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Add fast-
growing 
product 
categories 
Acquire 
Nutrisystem to 
enter in ready 
meals
Implement B2B strategy
The company is testing a pilot project in B2B, a segment with potential to
generate additional revenues
Change current product portfolio
Current products are mostly reduced-fat snacks. WW has the opportunity to sell
faster-growing product categories like organic, naturally-healthy or free-from
Implement strategy to offer more convenience
Ready meals and meal kits are the major options to cater to the growing number
of customers looking for convenience and time-saving in their eating habits
Several initiatives are proposed for WW to leverage on its core business and to grow the 
products segment
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Currently, WW is present in most developed countries. Expansion to underdeveloped
markets could make sense in the business perspective, as countries like Mexico and India
show changes in attitudes towards weight management and high obesity/overweight
levels. However, following a PE rationale, entering in these markets would represent
a significant investment (of capital and time), whereas return is unpredictable (e.g.,
WW is struggling with its Brazilian operations and unsuccessfully tried to enter the
Mexican market in the past). Therefore, as there is still value to create and solidify in
current markets, it is believed that WW should hold back on possible expansion plans,
leaving this opportunity to be explored by future target buyers in 5-7 years
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Leverage on services
Providing counselling, encouraging
community support and engaging with
subscribers in innovative ways is the core
business of the company. Due to the high
operating leverage of its core business, it is
paramount to increase revenues, which will
have a positive impact on EBITDA margin
Expand the products segment
Current product offering is considered to be
insufficient to cater customers trends, mainly
in terms of product categories and
convenience. It only represents 11% of WW’s
revenues and there is potential to capture
more value from the food consumption
stage of the customer journey
Grow B2C
While the company will continue observing a shift from meetings to online, it
should focus on acquisition and retention to improve top and bottom line results
Improve 
customer 
attraction and 
retention
Establish 
partnerships 
with 
corporations
Hold back on 
possible 
expansion 
plans
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Add fast-
growing 
product 
categories 
Acquire 
Nutrisystem to 
enter in ready 
meals
Implement B2B strategy
The company is testing a pilot project in B2B, a segment with potential to
generate additional revenues
Change current product portfolio
Current products are mostly reduced-fat snacks. WW has the opportunity to sell
faster-growing product categories like organic, naturally-healthy or free-from
Implement strategy to offer more convenience
Ready meals and meal kits are the major options to cater to the growing number
of customers looking for convenience and time-saving in their eating habits
Focusing on services, the company should aim at improving customer acquisition and 
attraction, while implementing B2B partnerships
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– Results from the pilot test show that the referral program can increase recruitment
among consumers who are new to the brand (40% of incremental subscribers
were new to the brand, up from ~33% of annual subscribers historically)
– Assuming that new subscribers’ retention rate is similar to WW’s retention rate (9.4
months), the subscriber acquisition cost associated with the initiative is less than
12% of revenue, which is below WW’s annual marketing expense rate of ~15.4%
– Potentially increase retention for current subscribers who may be encouraged to stay
on the program longer with their friend
– WW’s sales are seasonal, with ~40% of new joiners entering the program during 1Q,
typically related to New Year’s resolutions
– Smoothing sales seasonality would help to improve the seasonality of WW’s
profitability – 1Q is generally the least profitable quarter given the marketing spend
required to acquire new customers
Rationale* Strategy
– Focus on the online segment and adopt a communication
strategy centred on digital advertising, particularly influencer
advertising
– Refine advertising campaigns, featuring young people
– Launch special programs for brides and recent mothers
– Only ~17% of subscribers are women aged 18 to 34
– The average online customer is 10 years younger than the average customer (40 vs.
50), indicating younger women engage with WW primarily through the online channel
– Millennials are the key age demographic for e-commerce, spending more online
than any other age group (~$2,000 per year)
Women 
<35 
Men
*For additional information, see Attachment 5  
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– Implement a referral program similar to the one piloted in
Canada across all geographies where WW operates, until the
end of 2019, to take advantage of network effects and positive
feedback
– The program will offer WW’s members one month of the
program for free in exchange for convincing a friend to
enrol in a 3-month or 6-month commitment plan
Referral
Program
– Although obesity rates are similar among men and women, men comprise only ~27%
of weight management programmes participants (10% in WW)
– Academic research evidences a mismatch between men’s preferences and the
available offer. Men perceive weight management programmes as feminine and
dislike significant restrictions on food intake
– WW could increase male subscription rates by readjusting its communication strategy
and altering some product features to cater for men’s preferences
– Focus on the online channel and convey a message centred
on the app’s easiness to use and features like the activity
tracker
– Increase awareness through male influencer advertising
(e.g.: athletes, chefs and artists)
– Improve the content related to workout, adding exercise plans
which cater to men’s preferences
– Launch marketing campaigns featuring Ms. Winfrey and
other key influencers, which offer new members the
possibility to win prizes (e.g.: free trips, free lunches with
the celebrity featured in the campaign), at different times of
the year, particularly the ones when subscriber acquisition is
lower
Marketing
Campaigns
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Acquisition will primarily be driven by increased focus on non-core demographic 
segments and the implementation of a referral program
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Rewards 
Program
Wellness 
Experience
Ready-meals 
convenience
WW is implementing a health-based rewards program to increase member focus on logging on the app positive behaviour.
Subscribers would track their meals, physical activity and weight on the app, being able to redeem exclusive products/services. This
would lead to higher program efficacy, higher app engagement and better retention rates
Included in the rebranding strategy of the company, WW could broaden the program to include new activities for members, by
creating partnerships with companies that incentivise healthy habits (a good example is the partnership with Headspace, a
leader in meditation and mindfulness, to create customized content for WW members)
One of the value creation strategies is to acquire Nutrisystem, in order to cater to those WW subscribers who look for convenience in
their eating habits, by allowing them to purchase WW-branded ready meals. This will improve their satisfaction with the program
Subscriber average retention period is ~9.5 months but very few customers stay longer than 13/14 months. Therefore, WW could
apply price discounts in specific weight maintenance programs, for people who stay longer than 14 months in the program
Price discounts
Fitpoints
Voice 
Integration
New Connect 
Feature
Scale 
integration
Apart from SmartPoints, the company is implementing and improving the FitPoints system, where subscribers have activity goals
(fitness plans or workout regimens to improve energy, flexibility, strength or muscle toning) suitable to their physical characteristics.
WW’s app can also incorporate results from synced fitness devices like Fitbit
WW’s app is now allowing members to ask their Alexa or Google assistant to look up for SmartPoints value on food, to track
FitPoints, and get updates on their goals and progress, which increases ease of use
The Connect feature now allows members to create groups for people with the same interests, food preferences or in the same life
stage, where they can share their experiences. This allows WW to continuing incentivising community support between members
WW has a partnership with Conair, a scale producer, to sell WW-branded scales, where subscribers can sync it to the app and
monitor body fat, body water, bone mass, muscle mass and BM, making it easier to track health progress
Personalized 
marketing
Marketing Cloud allows WW to collect individual data regarding their customers, which enables the company to send personalised
emails to subscribers, based on their preferences, reminding them of their goals, keeping track of targets and encouraging the
purchase of additional products/services
Retention will primarily be driven by improving the app, introducing a rewards program
and broadening the scope to a more holistic approach to Wellness
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User 
Experience
User 
Interface
Pricing
The proposed acquisition and retention initiatives aim at sustaining high acquisition rates in both meetings and online segments, while lowering the 
churn rates. However, most of these initiatives will have a larger effect on the online segment, to follow the shift in consumer preferences
EOP subscribers in the online segment grow double-digit in the following years, while meetings growth rates are more moderate
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– Acquisition rates reached all-time highs in 2018,
being projected to decline in the upcoming years
– Subscriber growth is still generated in the future
as in the first quarter the acquisition rate is much
higher than the churn rate and compensates for the
loss in customers in the other quarters
– Due to previously discussed initiatives, acquisition
seasonality is expected to decline over time,
while churn rates decline 1p.p. per year
– As a result of the above acquisition rates, the
meetings and online segments are projected to
register significant growth rates in the following
years (online and meetings grow at 17.8% and 4.1%
CAGR from 2018 to 2021), stabilizing thereafter
– Due to higher acquisition rates, the online segment
grows much faster than meetings
– As previously discussed, the meetings segment has
lower gross margin but higher dollar contribution
per subscriber, which implies that, despite the
subscriber shift to online, this segment only
surpasses meetings in 2020
– Individual gross margins only increase marginally
over time, but the shift to the higher-margin
online business improves the overall margin
The shift to online implies that this segment’s revenues surpass meetings in 2020 and that overall gross margin improves
Proposed initiatives will sustain high acquisition rates, lower churn rates and smooth seasonality
Proposed initiatives will improve acquisition and churn rates, leading to significant 
subscriber and revenue growth, while online revenues should surpass meetings in 2020
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CAGR (’18-’23)
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…being these partnerships mutually beneficial for partner organizations and for WW
WW is testing a B2B model that 
can be easily replicated…
– WW is testing a B2B model, having
entered into an agreement with the
City of New York and its unions to offer
an agency wide weight loss and health
improvement program, in 2016. The
model has already successfully
attracted 4,000 people to enter the
program as WW provides digital
subscriptions and in-meeting plans to
employees at a discounted price, with
NYC subsidizing 50% of the expenses.
Employee Spouses, Domestic Partners,
and Dependents over the age of 18 are
also eligible for WW at a discounted
price
– The plan would be replicate this model
and to establish partnerships with
corporations and municipalities.
WW will provide programmes – digital
plan and meetings plan –at a
discounted price (33% discount for
Meetings to $30/ month and 25%
discount for Online to $14/ month)
and companies will subsidize part of
the program
For partner organizations*:
– WW’s scientifically-proven solutions encourage behavior change and an increase in quality of life, focused on food,
fitness and mindset, which can increase productivity, create a positive environment and reduce absenteeism
– Potential savings in healthcare insurance for employees/ employers could be exploited. In the US, obesity costs
employers $73.1bn per year and McKinsey & Company’s research strongly indicates weight-management
programs are among the most impactful and cost-efficient ways to mitigate obesity
– This kind of non-pecuniary benefits can attract better talent for corporations
20
For WW:
– By implementing WW’s plan in organizations, WW
would reach customers that would not be
interested in the program without their companies’
incentive; EOP subscribers will substantially grow
in the beginning years from the initial 4,000 in
4Q18, stabilizing after 2023
– Revenue growth will follow subscriber growth,
given that each meetings’ subscriber contributes
with a higher $ revenue, but a lower gross margin
– Overall gross margin improves over time as the
online segment grows faster than meetings
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Scaling B2B partnerships will allow WW to reach new customers that would not be 
interested in the program without their companies’ incentive
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* For additional information, see Attachment 6
Currently, WW is present in most developed countries. Expansion to underdeveloped
markets could make sense in the business perspective, as countries like Mexico and India
show changes in attitudes towards weight management and high obesity/overweight
levels. However, following a PE rationale, entering in these markets would represent
a significant investment (of capital and time), whereas return is unpredictable (e.g.,
WW is struggling with its Brazilian operations and unsuccessfully tried to enter the
Mexican market in the past). Therefore, as there is still value to create and solidify in
current markets, it is believed that WW should hold back on possible expansion plans,
leaving this opportunity to be explored by future target buyers in 5-7 years
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Leverage on services
Providing counselling, encouraging
community support and engaging with
subscribers in innovative ways is the core
business of the company. Due to the high
operating leverage of its core business, it is
paramount to increase revenues, which will
have a positive impact on EBITDA margin
Expand the products segment
Current product offering is considered to be
insufficient to cater customers trends, mainly
in terms of product categories and
convenience. It only represents 11% of WW’s
revenues and there is potential to capture
more value from the food consumption
stage of the customer journey
Grow B2C
While the company will continue observing a shift from meetings to online, it
should focus on acquisition and retention to improve top and bottom line results
Improve 
customer 
attraction and 
retention
Establish 
partnerships 
with 
corporations
Hold back on 
possible 
expansion 
plans
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Add fast-
growing 
product 
categories 
Acquire 
Nutrisystem to 
enter in ready 
meals
Implement B2B strategy
The company is testing a pilot project in B2B, a segment with potential to
generate additional revenues
Change current product portfolio
Current products are mostly reduced-fat snacks. WW has the opportunity to sell
faster-growing product categories like organic, naturally-healthy or free-from
Implement strategy to offer more convenience
Ready meals and meal kits are the major options to cater to the growing number
of customers looking for convenience and time-saving in their eating habits
Fast-growing product categories will be added to the portfolio and the option chosen to 
enter in the ready meals market and to offer more convenience is acquiring Nutrisystem
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– Although the overall US Health & Wellness market grew ~10.4% in the
2013-2017 period, WW’s product sales fell ~40.5% between 2013 and
2016, having shown modest signs of recovery only in 2017. This negative
trend corresponded to a market share decline from 0.13% in 2013 to
0.08% in 2017
– WW’s product offering is mainly comprised by reduced fat and reduced
sugar products, such as snacks, bars and yogurts. Portfolio composition
appears to be correlated with sales decline – Euromonitor’s market
research indicates consumers’ preferences are shifting away from
these product categories, which rely on the artificial removal of
ingredients (fat and sugar)
– This creates the opportunity for WW to offer a broader portfolio of
products, which could encompass both natural, healthy, organic and
free-from products – which are gaining traction and attracting more
people
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WW should also consider entering in the ready meals and/or meal 
kits segments, to add offer convenience
WW’s product offering runs short on its potential, creating the 
need to add different product categories
– Currently WW only captures value through providing dietary plans to
subscribers. The company could capture some extra value arising from
subscribers’ food expenses
– As customers look for portability and convenience, key areas where WW is
lagging behind its competitors, there is room for WW to enter the ready
meals and the meal kits markets. Consumers view these alternatives as
ways to save meal planning, shopping and cooking time, as well as to try new
recipes while being healthy
Ready meals: meals that
arrive already pre-cooked,
requiring little preparation
Meal kits: packs of fresh
ingredients to cook a meal
0
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– WW could consider entry options in the ready meals and meal kits
segments, as people are increasingly looking for this type of products and
competitors are establishing their position in the segments
Entering in the ready meals market or the meal kits market could revitalize WW’s 
current product offering and fast-growing product categories should be
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Partnership with a retail player, to produce and distribute WW ready meals
Development of in-house production and distribution capabilities
– In the US retail channel, sales of Health & Wellness ready meals amounted to $6.61bn in 2017 and are forecasted to grow
at a 7.4% CAGR in the 2019-2023, reaching $9.85bn in 2023
– Leading food companies, Nestlé and Conagra Brands, have long dominated HW ready meals sales in the retail channel.
Nevertheless, in spite of having made significant investments to meet increasing consumer demand for healthier, more
natural and more convenient food options both companies have been losing market share – Nestlé's market share dropped
from 20.8% in 2013 to 14.8% in 2017, while ConAgra’s market share dropped from 10.1% in 2013 to 9.7% in 2017
– Simultaneously, Amy’s Kitchen, a manufacturer manufactures organic and non-GMO convenience and frozen foods, has been
gaining traction, benefiting from the increasing demand for vegetarian meals
– Weight-management companies – Nutrisystem, MediFast, and Jenny Craig – are also present in this channel, although they
correspond only to a small share of retail sales
Entry options analysis
Competitive landscape
– Apart from the coordination and time needs, it would difficult to reach
meaningful scale within the holding period and incumbents benefit from
economies of scale and scope, which make them more cost-efficient
– A licensing agreement between Nestlé/Conagra Brands and WW would be
mutually beneficial. Nestlé/ConAgra could leverage on WW’s reputation in
the weight-management market, customer base and balanced meal plans to
strengthen its product portfolio and reach new consumers, ultimately
reversing market share decline (see attachment 7 for valuation of this
strategy)
Pro & Cons from WW perspective
Increased market penetration – Nestlé and Conagra Brands’ geographic
scope, large production capacity and distribution network would allow WW
ready meals to be available in most retail locations across the US territory
within a short time frame, something which would not be achievable
through partnerships with regional smaller players
Little to no capital requirement
Risk mitigation – the agreement would reduce economic and financial risk
Dependence on third-party – WW would have little to no control over
strategy execution. Low product quality could damage WW’s brand image
and reputation
Limited contribution to profits – royalties fees typically range between
6%-10% of revenues
Limited exit options – signing a licensing agreement with Nestlé or
ConAgra would narrow down potential strategic buyers, since other
industry players would have lower incentives to acquire a company
Market share
14.8%
6.8%
9.7%
2017 Sales ($ mn)
981
448
644
Top players in US H&W ready meals
(retail channel)
Acquisition of an incumbent player
– The leading incumbents are larger than WW and their product offering also
comprises categories which are not coherent with WW’s brand image.
Smaller players lack scale to make WW-ready meals available across the US
In the ready meals retail channel, a licensing agreement with a leading player would be 
the best option but it has a limited contribution to profits and bounds exit options
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Acquisition of a rival company, with home-delivery capabilities
Development of in-house production and distribution capabilities
Weighting the main advantages and drawbacks of the 2 strategic options – enter the retail channel through a licensing agreement with Nestlé or Conagra Brands and enter the 
home-delivery channel through the acquisition of Nutrisystem –, the 2nd option is the one which will be implemented since Nutrisystem’s acquisition (I) will reinforce
WW’s position in the US weight-management market, (II) will give rise to substancial synergies (see slide 27), and  (III) will not restrit exit options. The licensing 
agreement with Nestlé or Conagra can be seen as an alternative lever, in case the Nutrisystem’s acquisition fails (see attachment 7 for valuation of this alternative strategy)
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Publicly-traded players in 
the home-delivery channel– The home delivery channel is dominated by 3 WW’s competitors – Nutrisystem,
MedifFast, and Jenny Craig (private company). These companies operate primarily
under subscription-based models, offering nutritionally balanced meal plans and
ancillary counselling services targeted at a more upscale customer segment (upper-
middle class). Despite focusing on the home-delivery channel, these companies also
commercialize some products through traditional retail locations
– Besides weight-management companies, the home-delivery channel also encompasses
several smaller players such as Freshly, a provider of direct-to-consumer (DTC) healthy
prepared meals in which Nestlé invested $77mn
Market 
share
N/A
N/A
2017 Sales
($ mn)
697
302
Top public players in US H&W ready melas (home-delivery)
Entry options analysis
Competitive landscape
The timeframe necessary to reach meaningful scale is large (3-5
years) and the incumbents have the know-how to implement
more efficient cost structures
Among the leading players in the home-delivery channel,
Nutrisystem (NS) and MediFast (MF) are the only publicly-listed
companies. Given MediFast’s high EV/EBITDA multiple (18.2x as of
31/12/2018 and averaging 16.0x in the last three years) and
Nutrisystem’s strong performance, NS is the logical acquisition
target (11.3x by the end of 2018 and 13.8x in the last three years)
Pros & Cons from WW perspective
Market share gain – the acquisition would strengthen WW’s position in the US market,
enabling it to become the market leader in both weight-management services and products
Portfolio complementary & Synergies – there is a degree of complementarity between
both companies’ portfolio, which could be explored through the launching of ready meals
based on WW dietary plans
Scale & Supply Chain capabilities – NS has the scale and supply chain capabilities
necessary to service all WW customers in the US, who are interested in WW ready meals,
within 6 months after the acquisition
Broader exit options – contrarily to a licensing agreement with a leading food company,
the acquisition would not restraint the set of exit options
Significant capital commitment (EV of $1,199mn as of 31/12/2018)
In the ready meals home-delivery channel, the acquisition of Nutrisystem is the most 
attractive option as it allows for significant synergies
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The US meal kits market is dominated by 2 online subscription companies, Blue Apron (BA) and
HelloFresh (HF), which have been acquiring smaller players in the field (e.g., HF recently acquired
Green Chef, an organic meal kit company)
Companies have not generated profits yet and have been trying to reach critical scale through
aggressive strategies that contract margins (e.g., HF offers free delivery, 50%-off on the 1st order and
charges an average meal kit price of $8.5 vs. $9.4 from Blue Apron - BA). BA is growing at a much slower
rate than HF, as it is struggling with the emergence of more efficient, aggressive players
Only a very small fraction ($155mn) of meal kits are commercialized in retail channels. Nevertheless,
WW is testing a partnership with Sprouts Farmers, a retailer present in some US states, to sell meal
kits in its California stores. WW has also partnered up with FreshRealm, a small fresh food end-to-end
platform, to make meal kits available at grocery retail
Entry options analysis
Competitive landscape
The analysis conducted evidences that none of the entry options is attractive. Consequently, WW will refrain from entering the meal kits market within the first 2 years after 
the acquisition. In 2021, the decision will be reexamined
In-house production and distribution
Market share
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Leading players in the meal kit industry Top players in the US meal kit industry
Developing in-house production and
distribution capabilities would be too
costly and time-consuming.
Furthermore, none of the existing players
has yet reached critical mass – which
indicates the business would likely
generate losses in the medium term – and
several food industry analysts have
raised concerns on the sustainability of
BA and HF’s business model
Acquisition of one of the leading players 
Although an acquisition would allow
WW to leverage on the acquired
company’s customer base and know-
how, it would not be attractive from a
PE point of view given the significant
risk – incumbents are struggling to
reach critical mass and several
analysts have cast doubts on the
sustainability of BA and HF’s business
model – and capital commitment
Licensing Agreement with one of the leading players
Signing a licensing agreement with BA or HF presents several
advantages when compared to the other 2 entry options,
including the little to no capital requirements, and allowing the
focus to remain on weight-management programs instead of
partially shifting to meal kits production and distribution.
Nevertheless, given the typical royalty fees (6%-10% of
revenues), the impact on WW’s EBITDA would be relatively
small – according to the projections (see attachment 8), meal
kit commercialization would only result in a $3.64mn increase
in EBITDA in 2020, a contribution which would grow to
$5.67mn in 2023
In meal kits, none of the entry options seem attractive as the only viable one, a licensing 
agreement with a leading player, would have limited profitability
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Home-delivery 
channel
Retail channel
Supply chain
NS implemented an integrated order receipt, billing, picking
and shipping system to efficiently manage its interactions
with third parties in the value chain:
– Nutrisystem comercializes multi-day meal plans and single products (e.g., snacks,
bars) in Walmart and other major grocers. This offers brand exposure, as it is
an opportunity for consumers who may not be aware of their programs to sample
their products at a cheaper price
– Typically, customers order via telephone or website (92%) their monthly food
plan, but also via QVC (2%), a television shopping network
– Monthly plans range from $275 to $335, priced to serve upper-middle class
– Prices are slightly more competitive than those of competitors, with monthly
plans averaging $295 Jenny Craig’s $300 and MediFast’s $329
– Specialised counselling is free of charge and there is no membership fee
6%
94%
Production
• Production is outsourced to a
number of vendors to minimize fixed
costs and capital investments
• Storage and packaging are handled
by one provider, using its
outsourced facilities
• NS uses one outsourced shipping
provider for retail and another one
for home-delivery (where 94% of
initial orders were shipped within
three business days in 2017)
Fulfilment
Shipping
– NS is present in all US states, having seven
outsourced facilities, spread over the country
– Revenue: $701mn (+15% CAGR 2014-18)
– Gross Margin: 53%
– Selling & Marketing: 27% of Sales
– General & Administrative: 11% of Sales
– EBITDA: $99mn (14% margin)
– Net Income: $58 (8% profit margin)
High-Level Operating Figures (2018)Geographic presence
Distribution channels
NS meal plan features 235 food options, including frozen and ready-to-go breakfasts, lunches, dinners,
snacks and flex meals, which can be complemented with fresh fruits, vegetables, lean protein and dairy
Historical growth
– Nutrisystem has been able to grow revenues and EBITDA
(CAGRs of 14.4% and 55.3%, respectively)
– Revenues are expected to increase by 7% in 2019
(Bloomberg consensus)
Nutrisystem’s supply chain relies on third parties, a business model which has allowed 
the company to improve margins and grow revenues by 14% per annum since 2013
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The plan would be to keep two separated brands but to allow WW’s subscribers to 
order WW’s recommended meals, using NS’s capabilities
– NS would be acquired on 01/2020 by ~$1,341
mn. Considering its 2019 Bloomberg consensus’
estimated EBITDA, this deal would represent a
TV/(EBITDA-CSE) multiple of 12.9x and a
TV/EBITDA multiple of 11.9x (see attachment 9 for
more detailed valuation information)
– Standalone revenues are estimated, by Bloomberg
consensus, to grow by 7% in 2019, and that growth
rate is believed to be maintained
– Gross and EBITDA margins should also continue at
2019 levels, which are also estimated by Bloomberg
consensus
– Within the H&W market, WW and NS have different customer bases and business models:
 WW is a service-based company, focused on providing diet plans. tools and support, while giving
them the flexibility in their food choices (despite also selling some products like snacks and bars)
 NS is a product-based company that targets people who want to save cooking and shopping time
by acquiring healthy meal-replacement plans (despite also providing a free counselling service)
– Due to these differences, it is believed to be more logical to keep two separated brands, in order to
leverage on each company’s strong brand image on their different segments
– These business models are still generally perceived as substitute methods: WW’s subscribers
prefer WW because they believe that a more personalized counselling, a motivating goal tracking
system and the supportive WW’s community help them deliver intended results; NS’s subscribers opt
for their programmes as they believe in the effectiveness of meal-replacement plans and counselling
– However, it is believed that there is some level of complementarity: it is believed that 5% of WW’s
North America subscribers would like to save cooking and shopping time if they could directly buy
WW-branded meals on its app/website, taking advantage of NS’s value chain capabilities (synergies)
Sell healthy food
Weightwatchers Other players ( mostly retailers)
Nutrisystem
Provide counselling service
WW subscribers
NS subscribers
Potential 
synergies
0%
60%
0
750
1,500
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Synergies ($ mn) Standalone Business ($ mn)
Gross Margin EBITDA Margin
Note: scale is 
illustrative
Nutrisystem’s growth would be reinforced by 
synergies with WW
Nutrisystem’s business can complement WW by selling WW-branded ready meals using 
Nutrisystem’s resources, creating ~$250mn of additional revenues in 2023
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($ mn) 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Revenues 1,164 1,165 1,307 1,537 1,722 2,916 3,103 3,246 3,408
% Growth -21% 0% 12% 18% 12% 69% 6% 5% 5%
Weight Watchers 1,164 1,165 1,307 1,537 1,722 1,884 2,002 2,082 2,172
% Growth -21% 0% 12% 18% 12% 9% 6% 4% 4%
Services 937 949 1,082 1,289 1,455 1,611 1,722 1,795 1,878
Meetings 588 605 665 717 743 765 778 790 812
Online 350 344 417 571 713 844 937 981 1021
Product Sales & Other 227 216 225 248 266 273 280 287 294
Nutrisystem N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1,032 1,101 1,164 1,236
% Growth N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 7% 6% 6%
Cost of revenues (590) (579) (614) (653) (689) (1,197) (1,249) (1,291) (1,338)
% of Revenues 51% 50% 47% 42% 40% 41% 40% 40% 39%
Weight Watchers (590) (579) (614) (653) (689) (720) (740) (752) (767)
Gross Margin 49% 50% 53% 58% 60% 62% 63% 64% 65%
Nutrisystem N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A (477) (509) (539) (572)
Gross Margin N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 54% 54% 54% 54%
Operating Expenses (406) (385) (425) (474) (532) (981) (1,044) (1,093) (1,149)
Weight Watchers (406) (385) (425) (474) (532) (582) (618) (643) (671)
% of Revenues 35% 33% 33% 31% 31% 31% 31% 31% 31%
Nutrisystem N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A (399) (426) (451) (478)
% Revenues N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A -39% -39% -39% -39%
EBITDA* 221 253 319 448 543 787 864 922 984
% Growth -37% 15% 26% 41% 21% 45% 10% 7% 7%
EBITDA Margin (%) 19% 22% 24% 29% 32% 27% 28% 28% 29%
Weight Watchers 221 253 319 448 543 631 699 746 798
Nutrisystem N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 155 166 175 186
– WW is expected to continue the recent recovery, 
being able to grow significantly in the next three 
years and stabilizing afterwards
– Growth is mostly driven by the online segment 
(13.3% CAGR from 2018 to 2023), while meetings 
(2.5% CAGR) and product sales (3.5% CAGR) should 
present moderate growth
– The acquisition of Nutrisystem in 2020 makes 
revenues jump in that year and that business is 
expected to grow around 6% per year
– WW’s gross margins improve due to high 
operating leverage and revenue growth, but also 
due to the shift from meetings to online
– Nutrisystem’s gross margin is expected to be constant 
in the future
– The bet on marketing and employee motivation is to 
be maintained, being reflected in the fact that 
operating expenses are projected to follow recent 
levels as a % of revenues
– EBITDA’s recent growth will slow down, being 
boosted by Nutrisystem’s acquisition in 2020 (which 
lowers consolidated EBITDA margin in that year, as it 
is a lower-margin business)
– WW will represent most of the consolidated EBITDA
Bottom line results will be boosted by WW’s revenue growth and gross margin 
improvement, as well as Nutrisystem’s acquisition and revenue growth
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* WW includes depreciation in the cost of revenues, being added back in order to calculate EBITDA
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WW CAPEX ($ mn)
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Nutrisystem CAPEX ($ mn)
CAPEX Capitalized Software Expenses
– EBITDA growth is mostly explained by growth in B2C, due to 
the initiatives to improve subscriber acquisition and retention
– Launching B2B generates incremental $25mn
– Post-acquisition Nutrisystem’s EBITDA growth increases  the 
company’s value creation impact by 65%
– Consolidated EBITDA is 120% higher in 2023 than WW’s 
EBITDA in 2018
– WW is a low-CAPEX business in nature, being the future Capital investments 
projected to ensure the company’s normal course of operations, with no 
significant structural changes. Increasing effort in improving user interfaces is 
reflected in the increase in Capitalized Software Expenses
– Nutrisystem is also a low-CAPEX business and does not distinguish CAPEX 
categories (expansion and maintenance) in its annual reports. Capitalized 
Software Expenses are expected to gradually increase as the company grows 
(the jump in 2020 is related to the integration in WW’s app)
Nutrisystem’s acquisition and Capital Expenditures around ~$90mn per annum will 
yield a $536mn increase in annual EBITDA by 2023
CAPEX breakdown
EBITDA breakdown
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• Capital Structure
• Management Incentive Package
Capital Structure
Debt Repayment Schedule
Debt Structure
Total Equity financing will be $3,587 million, or 61% of total sources
– Fixed Return Instrument: Representing $3,001 million, or 51% of Total Sources, the
FRI will guarantee an annual rate of return (PIK) of 10%. 5% of this instrument ($150
million) will be owned by the management team and Oprah
– Ordinary Shares: 15% of Ordinary Shares ($87.87 million) will be owned as Sweet
Equity by the management team and Oprah – who will also own an extra $24 million in
the institutional strip of Ordinary Shares. Ordinary Shares will represent 10% of Total
Sources
WW’s current debt will be repaid (Notes are callable at 104 and the Term Loan
prepayment fee is 1%) and the company will be refinanced. The new capital
structure will be based on senior debt only, to accommodate for higher flexibility,
given the ambitious business plan*. All debt is expected to have a B+ rating
(according to BNP Paribas) and therefore, according to current market conditions
(attachment 10), the debt structure that best fits the company is as follows:
– Term Loan B: Representing 2.5x Adj. EBITDA**, or $1,032 million, TLB is a
bullet loan accruing interest at 4%+LIBOR per year and will mature in 2025. A
1% Banking fee was assumed for this loan
– Senior Notes: 6.5% annual coupon bonds, maturing in 2025 representing 3x
Adj. EBITDA, or $1,238 million. A 1% investment banking fee was assumed
– Capex Facility: $805 million will cover 60% of Nutrisystem’s acquisition in
2020 (the remaining 40% will be funded with cash ), and will be repaid from
year 5 to year 7, paying an interest of LIBOR+2.75% and a commitment fee of
35% of the margin (0.5% arrangement fee)
1,266 1,266 1,266 1,266 1,266 1,266
1,055 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,055
860 860 860 573 287
0.0x
1.0x
2.0x
3.0x
4.0x
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
Total debt ($ mn) and leverage (x)
Note Term Loan CF Net Debt/Adj EBITDA
There is significant deleveraging arising from EBITDA growth throughout the
investment period (note that a debt rollover/refinancing is expected by 2024)
Equity Structure
*Sensitivity analysis on junior debt was performed and can be found in slide 37
**Adj. EBITDA = EBITDA – Capitalized Software Expenses, a proxy to cash generation
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WW’s debt structure will be all senior, with 2.5x TLB and 3x Senior Notes; Capex Facility will 
fund 60% of Nutrisystem’s acquisition in 2020, being the remaining 40% funded with cash
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Sources $ mn x Adj. EBITDA Uses $ mn x Adj. EBITDA
Total debt 2,270 5.50 Purchase of equity 4,054 9.82 
Senior debt 2,270 5.50 
Senior Bonds 1,238 3.00 Repayment of debt 1,773 4.29 
Term Loan B 1,032 2.50 Senior Notes 312 0.76 
Total Equity 3,587 8.69 Loan 1,461 3.54 
Institutional Equity 3,324 8.05 
FRI 2,851 6.91 Fees 30 0.07 
Ordinary Shares 473 1.15 IB 12 0.03 
Management 262 0.64 Banking 10 0.03 
FRI 150 0.36 Arrangement 5 0.01 
Ordinary Shares 25 0.06 DD 2 0.00 
Sweet Equity 88 0.21 
Total sources 5,857 14.19 Total uses 5,857 14.19 
Taking into account the after tax market values of the current
management ownership, the management team and Oprah Winfrey
will be given 19% control over the company (10.7pp higher than before
LBO). This will result in exit proceeds of $680 million for the executive
management and $786 million for Oprah (returns of 10.06 and 4.04,
respectively)
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Current WW’s management incentives scheme is
based on wage compensation and company
ownership. This incentives scheme has been
working well in aligning the management team
with the shareholders. After the LBO, wage
compensation will remain unchanged and each
member of the management team will have 1.5x of
its annual salary worth in sweet equity, which
will represent 15% of ordinary shares. Moreover,
current ownership of the company will be
rolled-over as institutional investment
Ownership Structure
Fund
80.7%
Management
10.5%
Oprah
8.8%
Oprah Winfrey is a valuable asset for customer acquisition. Ever since the partnership
was created, EBITDA grew 103%, from $221m to $448m, driven by a subscribers growth of
37%. Although these results are not solely due to Oprah, she was a very important factor. As
so, the management package is designed in such a way that Ms. Winfrey does not lose any
market value from the transaction. Ms. Winfrey is not part of the executive management
team and therefore, her share of equity is mainly on the institutional strip
Oprah’s stake
90%
10%
Institutional Strip
Sweet Equity
In order keep incentives aligned,
10% of her current position will be
used to acquire sweet equity, the
remaining 90% will be equally
divided into ordinary shares and FRI.
The higher returns from the
management strip should guarantee
her loyalty to the company
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The management team and Oprah will by entitled to 7.3% of total equity (Envy Ratio of 1.5); 
Oprah, a key asset for the company, will have 10% of her current position in sweet equity
Annual Salary 
($ mn)
MV of position 
($ mn)
Sweet Equity
Institutional 
Ords
FRI Return (2023)
Mindy F. Grossman 33.37 2.73 50.06 0.26 1.59 10.61
Nicholas P. Hotchkin 2.61 4.57 3.92 0.44 2.66 7.37
Michael F. Colosi 1.54 0.85 2.31 0.08 0.50 9.29
Stacey Mowbray 1.46 0.79 2.19 0.08 0.46 9.32
Corinne Pollier 1.36 1.32 2.04 0.13 0.77 8.46
Oprah Winfrey - 273.44 27.34 23.81 143.53 4.04
Total 40.34 283.7 87.87 24.3 150.02
• Valuation
• Returns breakdown and covenants
• Sensitivity/Break-even analysis
Valuation & Returns
0.0
10.0
20.0
0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0%
EV/EBITDA vs 2Y Forecasted Revenue Growth
0.0
10.0
20.0
0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0%
EV/EBITDA vs 3Y Historical Revenue Growth
WW will be acquired by ~$5.6bn, at a 13.5x EV/(EBITDA-CSE) multiple or 12.4x 
EV/EBITDA multiple, after performing a valuation analysis based on different methods
DCF
EV/EBITDA 2018
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8.0
12.0
16.0
20.0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Through-the-cycle EV/(EBITDA – CSE)
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
- The median EV/EBITDA for direct competitors
registers a median of 12.6x (implying an EV of
$5,757mn) and for other comparables the
median multiple is 10.9x (EV of $4,980mn)
- Analyzing the direct trading competitors’
multiples, the 2Y and 5Y medians predict an EV of
$6,409mn and $6,282mn, respectively
Regression
- Historical revenue growth predicts an
EV/EBITDA of 13x (implying an EV of $5,816mn)
and forecasted revenue growth indicates a
multiple of 11.9x (EV of $5,306mn)
Analyst Report Date EV/(EBITDA-CSE)
JP Morgan 12/06/2018 20.5
Morgan Stanley 13/09/2018 16.5
UBS 09/07/2018 21.9
0 1,500 3,000 4,500 6,000 7,500 9,000
WW - EV/(EBITDA - CSE) (3Y)
WW - DCF
Direct trading comps - EV/(EBITDA - CSE) (2Y)
Direct trading comps - EV/(EBITDA - CSE) (5Y)
Trading comps - Regression Analysis
Other trading comps - EV/EBITDA 2018e
Direct trading comps - EV/EBITDA 2018e
Enterprise Value ($ mn)
5Y Median 15.2x
2Y Median 15.5x
$5,573mn – WW would be acquired by $5,573mn, based on a 13.5x EV/(EBITDA-Capit.
Soft. Exp.) multiple, which corresponds to a 12.4x EV/EBITDA multiple
– As can be seen by analysing WW’s historical valuation multiple, the company
usually trades below the average industry peer
– This transaction value is 36% higher than the end-of-2018 EV of the company,
which represents a timing opportunity as the company’s EV in the recent
weeks declined, reaching an EV/EBITDA’18E multiple of 9.0 (see attachment 11)
– The multiples in the industry are considerably high as this is a growing business
with most companies registering double digit recent growth
Direct comps Other comps
Median: 12.6x Median: 10.9x 
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Bank case covenants
- In the bank case, customer acquisition rates, average revenue
per costumer and EBITDA margins drop 0.5% while the
churned rate and Capex increase 0.5% for all businesses in
Weight Watchers, as well as a drop of 0.5% in Nutrisystem’s
annual revenue growth and EBITDA margin
- A debt rollover/refinancing is expected by 2024
- Until exit, in 2023, assuming no debt rollover/refinancing no
covenant is breached, with significant headroom
- The fund is expected to have a money multiple
return of ~2.9 in a 5-year horizon (2023), the
expected exit date, corresponding to an IRR of
24%. Nonetheless, keeping the investment for 7
years (2025) would yield returns of 3.52
(assuming similar financing conditions in 2024)
- The executive management is expected a
money multiple return of 10 – which implies
exit proceeds of $673m -, while Oprah is
expected a multiple return of 3.99. Combined,
this yields a return of 6.10 by 2023
- The entry multiple will be 13.5x Adj. EBITDA,
supported by the entry valuation analysis and is
assumed to be constant upon exit (no multiple
arbitrage)
Investment Case Returns
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The deal would generate high returns for the fund and for managers after five 
years, being all bank case covenants respected
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($ mn) 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Adj EBITDA 503 732 806 860 920 963 1,003
Exit Multiple 13.5 13.5 13.5 13.5 13.5 13.5 13.5
EV 6,795 9,877 10,880 11,616 12,422 12,997 13,538
Returns
Management Exit Proceeds 502 868 1,094 1,271 1,466 1,617 1,762
Management Equity 262 262 262 262 262 262 262
Management Returns (MM) 1.92 3.31 4.17 4.85 5.59 6.17 6.72
IRR 82% 61% 48% 41% 35% 31%
Institutional Investor Exit Proceeds 4,531 6,309 7,524 8,561 9,699 10,691 11,690
Institutional Investor Equity 3,324 3,324 3,324 3,324 3,324 3,324 3,324
Institutional Returns (MM) 1.36 1.90 2.26 2.58 2.92 3.22 3.52
IRR 38% 31% 27% 24% 21% 20%
($ mn) 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Cash Cover 2.8 3.0 2.8 2.9 1.6 1.7 0.1
Covenant 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Net Senior debt/EBITDA 3.4 3.8 3.1 2.6 2.0 1.5 1.0
EBITDA/Cash interest 3.3 4.3 4.0 4.1 4.4 4.8 5.1
Covenant 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
Entry EV
Exit EV (2023) -
Investment Case
Exit EV (2023) -
Bank Case
Sweet Equity 88 957 559
Institutional Ords 498 5,423 3,166
FRI 3,001 4,785 4,785
Net Debt 2,064 1,253 1,637
0
7,000
14,000
EV breakdown evolution ($ mn)
– As seen before, the bank case is more conservative in all the 
operating model projections, yielding an exit EV of  $10,151mn, 
22% lower than the investment case exit EV of $12,421mn
– Net Debt is lower in the investment case as more cash is 
generated
– FRI is naturally the same in both cases
– Most of the upside is in ordinary equity
– Sweet Equity still presents relevant returns in the bank case
Equity Value jumped 211% from entry to exit date:
– Fees amount to 2.5% of the transaction EV and the increase in Capitalized Software Expenses
also affect negatively the Equity Value
– No multiple arbitrage is assumed (i.e., exit multiple = entry multiple)
– Cash generates additional value as positive CF’s over the holding period allow for deleveraging
– Growth in WW’s EBITDA margin contributes significantly, while Nutrisystem’s margin is constant
– Revenue growth is the major driver of value creation, being sustained by Nutrisystem’s 
acquisition and growth in the B2C business
Investment case vs. Bank case Equity Value drivers
Margin 
Expansion
Revenue 
growth
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The bank case, although being more conservative, still has a significant upside, 
while Equity Value increases ~$7.1bn
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WW + Nutrisystem average 
annual Cap. Soft. Exp.
WW Meetings revenue 
CAGR
WW exit multiple
WW average EBITDA 
margin
Nutrisystem average 
EBITDA margin
WW entry multiple
WW Online revenue CAGR
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Nutrisystem Revenue CAGR
Nutrisystem entry multiple
Returns are more sensitive to WW’s online growth and EBITDA margin, as well as to 
entry/exit multiples; Returns are still meaningful if Nutrisystem cannot be acquired
C
S
E
Current value w/ Inst. 
MM=2.92 in 2023*
Value* for Inst. 
MM=2.5 in 2023*
Risk mitigation/comfort
13.3% 8.7% (-35%)
2.5% -33.3% (-1,433%)
12.0% -10.3% (-185%)
33.9% 29.3% (-14%)
15.0% 6.3% (-58%)
13.5 14.8 (+10%)
13.5 11.6 (-14%)
12.9 28.4 (+120%)
$55.6mn $326.2mn (+487%)
Deal funded by junior debt 
instead of Term Loan B**
Deal without Nutrisystem’s 
acquisition***
Deal without Nutrisystem’s acquisition but 
with licensing agreement in ready meals****
Institutional Money Multiple in alternative scenarios 2.81 2.61 2.69
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*; Institutional MM of 2.92 and 2.50 correspond to IRRs 
of ~24% and ~20%, respectively
** Part of the deal is still funded by Bonds *** No alternative strategy **** See slide 23 
- Shift to higher-margin online segment and high operating leverage will
improve gross margins; other op. expenses will follow revenue growth
- Efficient cost structure; slim business model reliant on specialized
third parties; gradual growth of EBITDA margins in the past
- High expected returns; significant premium (39%) over end-of-2018
trading EV; WW usually trades below the average industry peer
- Diverse target buyers with potential to capture synergies (see slide 39);
opportunities to be explored (e.g., international expansion)
- High expected returns; alternative levers like licensing agreement in
ready meals
- Initiatives to improve acquisition and retention; shift to online;
reduced cyclicality; strong recent growth (29% CAGR in 2016-2018)
- Initiatives to improve acquisition and retention; Community support
as an important asset; in-meeting sales of new product categories
- Strong track record (double-digit growth in 2013-2017); increasing
demand for convenient and healthy; competitive prices and quality
- Most software infrastructures are already implemented; innovation
will be guaranteed by reasonable investments
• Exit Options and Target Buyers
• Areas to Due Diligence
Exit Options & Due Diligence
A trade sale is the desired exit option, since the buyers may be willing to pay more, given the existence of synergies
Considering the relatively small size of WW’s direct competitors, it is highly unlikely that WW will be acquired another weight-
management services provider. 3 main potential buyers – Nestlé, Procter & Gamble and Unilever – were selected among the leading
companies which operate within the Health Global Healthy Eating, Nutrition & Weight Loss market, taking into factors such as size,
financial strength and past acquisitions – for additional information see attachment 12
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Even though IPO is the most likely exit option, trade sale would still be very likely, with 
various potential buyers positioned to capture synergies from a potential acquisition
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IPO
Secondary 
Sale
Trade Sale
Likelihood
Given WW’s forecasted size at the time of exit, an IPO stands as the most probable exit option. The outcome of an IPO is uncertain, being
highly dependent on factors such as pricing, timing and changes in the underlying market conditions – for a detailed analysis of
IPO success factors see attachment 13 –, which must be monitored closely. In particular, since WW’s business is consumer cyclical – the
demand for WW’s services is positively correlated with the business cycle –, taking the company public during an expansionary period
would be crucial to ensure a successful exit
– Similarly to its competitors, Kraft Heinz has been adjusting to increasing health consciousness – the company has
removed artificial colours from its products and announced the launch of Springboard Brands, a business focused
on finding and growing natural and organic brands
– Despite these initiatives, Kraft Heinz has been struggling to grow and acquiring WW would allow Kraft Heinz to add
product categories to its portfolio and strengthen its overall position in the H&W space
– Unilever has been loosing market share in the H&W food market and this decline can be explained by (I) the
company’s “old-fashioned” H&W product portfolio, which is focused on fortified/functional packaged food and
“better for you” packaged food; and (II) scepticism regarding the healthiness of its products
– Acquiring WW would allow Unilever to broaden its offer, by incorporating WW’s healthier product categories
– Nestlé’s strategy is increasingly reliant on healthy, natural and organic product categories
– Despite the investments to meet increasing consumer demand for healthier and more convenient food options, Nestlé
has failed to meet its annual 5% sales growth target and has been loosing market share in several product
categories, including ready meals
– Acquiring WW would allow Nestlé to strengthen its product offering and to cement its position in H&W
RationaleCompany
Given the size of the typical investments made by leading PE firms, a secondary sale is possible, particularly in the form of a club deal.
KKR and TPG would be the most likely candidates among the analysed firms, considering their past investments in the weight-
management market – see attachment 14
Analysis
Growth
Competition
Oprah Winfrey
Nutrisystem
– Verify the assumptions regarding the US Weight Management market outlook
– Conduct an in-depth analysis of the market outlook in non-core geographies, identifying key growth
drivers
– Identify unmet market opportunities
– Conduct surveys and focus groups to confirm WW’s differentiation and superior offering
– Conduct an in-depth competitor analysis in non-core geographies, identifying major threats to WW
Description Importance
Legal 
Proceedings
Contracts
Legislation 
– Verify if there are any ongoing legal actions against WW and assess the potential impact of a negative
outcome
– Review contracts with key parties, including employees, franchisees, licensees and IT services providers;
and estimate the risk and consequences of contract breaches
– Analyse employment polices and compensation schemes (including the existence of golden parachutes)
Commercial
Legal & HR
– Review the legislation in the countries where WW operates regarding areas such as employment,
marketing and advertising, products and services and data protection
– Identify expected regulatory/legislative changes and trends and evaluate their potential impact on WW
Tax
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– Verify if WW is following an effective tax-optimizing strategy, reviewing the tax legislation in the countries
where it operates and identifying expected changes in tax legislation
– Review transfer pricing policies
Tax 
optimization
– Forecast the impact on sales of partnership termination 
– Identify alternative influencers to mitigate the negative impact of a partnership termination 
– Monitor closely Nutrisystem’s performance in 2019 and adjust the entry multiple and projections
accordingly
– Identify potential conflicts which may arise from differences in company culture and define a strategic
approach to mitigate them and to align incentives
– Conduct a preliminary assessment of how operations will be integrated and aligned
– Assess the likelihood of meeting synergies forecast
Commercial Due Diligence will be paramount in the upcoming weeks, in order to have a 
better perception on potential growth, Oprah’s impact and Nutrisystem’s potential
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Operational 
Improvements
IT
– Measure customer satisfaction through surveys and focus groups and identify key areas for improvement
– Perform a detailed value chain analysis, identifying possible inefficiencies and defining a strategic
approach to reverse them
– Evaluate the performance of the pilot tests which the company has launched during the 2nd half of 2018 
and adjust forecasts accordingly
– Conduct an in-depth analysis of WW’s ability to protect the integrity of its IT systems against damage from
third-party cyber-attacks, fire, power loss, earthquakes, telecommunications failures and similar
unexpected adverse events
– Assess WW’s digital platforms in terms of easiness of use and efficiency to determine key areas for
improvement
– Examine in detail recent expenditure on IT systems and adjust future investment estimations
Description Importance
Valuation & 
Exit
Markets
– Adjust valuation according to the outcome of due diligence  
– Conduct an in-depth analysis of identified potential buyers
Operational
& 
IT
Valuation & Exit
– Review WW’s accounting polices and assess the accuracy of  financial reported information
– Examine debt, assessing if there are any debt misrepresentations (debt-like positions omissions) that could 
understate the amount of net debt
– Perform deeper analysis on NWC to adjust target’s valuation
Financial
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Reported 
Information
– Examine the outlook for general economic conditions, developments in credit markets, and equity market
volatility
– Analyse WW’s currency hedging and risk management tools
Management
– Assess if  the management team is motivated and aligned with the new strategy 
– Determine if the team needs to be strengthened in some areas and identify potential experts to be hired
Incentives
6-8 weeks                                                                ~$2mn
Other key areas for Due Diligence include operational & IT assessment, management 
incentives alignment, financial conditions and valuation; DD should amount to $2mn
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Attachments
Name Position Age Gender 1st year at WW 1st year at current position
Mindy F. Grossman President & CEO 60 Female 2017 2017
Nicholas P. Hotchkin CFO & President, Emerging Markets 52 Male 2012 2012
Debra Benovitz Senior Vice-President, Global Consumer Insights Female 2014 2014
Michael F. Colosi General Counsel & Secretary 52 Male 2014 2014
Gary Foster Chief Scientific Officer 58 Male 2013 2013
Michael Korcuska Chief Product Officer Male 2017 2017
Michael Lysaght Chief Technology Officer Male 2014 2016
Stacey Mowbray President, North America 55 Female 2014 2016
Corinne Pollier President, International 53 Female 2003 2014
Kimberly A. Samon Chief People Officer 50 Female 2014 2014
Stacie Sherer Senior Vice-President, Corporate Communicaions Female 2012 2017
Gail B. Tifford Chief Brand Officer 48 Female 2018 2018
President & CEO: Mindy Grossman
– Took over as CEO in July 2017. Previously, Mrs. Grossman
served as Chief Executive Officer of HSN, Inc., a multichannel
retailer of fashion, household and lifestyle products; and held
various executive positions at Nike, Ralph Lauren and Tommy
Hilfiger
– Education: B.A. (The George Washington University)
CFO & Emerging Markets President: Nicholas P. Hotchkin
– Has served as WW’s CFO since 2012. Previously, Mr. Hotchkin
served as a Senior Vice-President of Finance at Staples, Inc. and
held several corporate finance positions with Delphi
Corporation and General Motors Corporation
– Education: B.A. in Economics and M.B.A. (Harvard Business
School)
Management Team – Profiles
Management Team
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Attachment 1 – Management Team Overview (1/3) 
SVP, Global Consumer Insights: Debra Benovitz
– Has served as WW’s Senior Vice-President for Global Consumer
Insights since October 2014. Previously, has held senior
positions at PepsiCo (Global VP Strategy and Insights) and Dr
Pepper Snapple Group (VP Consumer Insights)
– Education: BA (Columbia University) and MBA (Wisconsin
School of Business)
General Counsel and Secretary: Michael F. Colosi
– Has been General Counsel and Secretary at WW since May
2014. Previously, has held several senior positions at Kenneth
Cole Productions Inc.
– Education: B.A. in Economics and English (Cornell University)
and J.D. (Michigan Law School)
Chief Science Officer : Gary Foster
– Has been WW’s Chief Science Officer since July 2014.
Previously, Dr. Foster was the Director of the Center for Obesity
Research and Education at Temple University.
– Education: B.A. in Psychology (Duquesne University), M.S. in
Psychology (University of Pennsylvania), and a Ph.D. in Clinical
Psychology (Temple University).
Chief Product Offcer: Michael Korcuska
– Has served as WW’s Chief Product Officer, where he leads product
transformation, since November 2017. Previously, Mr. Korcuska was
Vice President of Product Management at LinkedIn, where here he led
several product teams, including LinkedIn’s products for China
– Education: B.S. in Symbolic Systems (Stanford University) and M.S. in
Computer Science (Northwestern University)
Chief Technology Officer: Michael Lysaght
– Has served as WW’s Chief Technology Officer since September 2016.
Previously, Mr. Lysaght served as WW’s SVP of Digital Product
Engineering from September 2014 to September 2016 and as Interim
CTO from April 2016 to September 2016. Prior to joining WW, Mr.
Lysaght worked at SecondMarket
– Education: B. Sc. in Computer Science (University College Cork)
President, Americas: Stacey Mowbray
– Has served as WW’s President, Americas since March 2016. Prior to that
time, Ms. Mowbray served as President and General Manager of Weight
Watchers Canada (2014-2016), as CEO of Second Cup Ltd. (2009-2014).
– Education: B.B.A (Wilfrid Laurier University) and M.B.A (York
University)
Management Team – Profiles
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Attachment 1 – Management Team Overview (2/3) 
President, International: Corinne Pollier
– Has served as WW’s President, International since March 2016.
Previously, Mrs. Pollier held several senior ranks in the
company, including President of Continental Europe &
Australia–New Zealand (2014-2016) and President of
Continental Europe (2013-2014)
– Education: Masters in Management (HEC Business School Paris)
Chief People Officer: Kimberly Samon
– Has served as WW’s Chief People Officer since 2014. Previously,
Ms. Samon worked as Executive VP of HR and Corporate
Strategy with Simmons Bedding Company
– Education: B.A. in Industrial and Labor Relations from Cornell
University, M.B.A in Management (Mercer University), and a J.D.
with a focus in Labor and Employment Law (Stetson
University).
SVP, Corporate Communications: Stacie Sherer
– Was appointed Senior Vice President, Corporate Communications in July
2017. Previously, Ms. Sherer served as WW’s Vice President, Public
Relations. Prior to Weight Watchers, Ms. Sherer was a Managing
Director at Burson-Marsteller, a global, full-service communications
agency
– Education: B.S. in Business Administration (Miami University)
Chief Brand Officer: Gail Tifford
Has oined WW as Chief Brand Officer in March 2018. Prior to WW, Ms.
Tifford served as Vice President of Media North America and Global Digital
Innovation for Unilever, and as Vice President, Strategic Partnerships at
Viacom
Education: B.A. In Psychology (Tuffs University) and J.D. (Brooklyn Law
School)
Management Team – Profiles
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Attachment 1 – Management Team Overview (3/3) 
WW’s core addressable market
WW’s Serviceable Addressable Market
31mn
63mn
126mn
245mn
WW's Core Market
Aged 35-64
Female
US Adult Population
0
10
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50
Core Market International Younger
Subscribers
Men Serviceable
Addressable
Market
m
n
Despite its broad geographic presence, WW is mainly focused on the
US Weight Management Market. Narrowing the scope and considering
the gender (~90% of subscribers are female) and age (~81.8% of
subscribers are older than 35) breakdown of WW’s customers, as well
as the rate of US adults who actively try to control their weight
(49%), it is possible to define the company’s core addressable
segment: middle-to-older aged women (35-64) in the US who are
either overweight/obese or are actively trying to control their weight.
Alongside with the Core Addressable Market described above, WW’s
Target Market is composed by three other subgroups. First, and as it
was already mentioned, WW holds worldwide operations and so a
significant part of its target market is also composed by international
subscribers. Second, WW is also capable of targeting some American
younger female subscribers, even though such number is residual
(~3mn). Finally, despite WW’s services being mainly subscribed by a
female audience, a slight portion of American Men buy such services
and products and so end up being part of WW Target Market
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Attachment 2 – Market estimations
Lifestyle diseasesObesity Levels 
– According to NCHS, from 2000 to 2016, a significantly increasing trend in obesity
was observed in both adults (>20years) and youth (2-19 years). Obesity
prevalence rates, which correspond to the proportion of persons in a population
who have a particular disease or attribute at a specified point in time, increase in
both groups
– In 2016, prevalence rates were higher among middle-aged adults (42.8%) than
among younger adults (35.7%). Furthermore, women registered higher
prevalence rate across all age demographics
– Linear time trend forecasts suggest that by 2030, 51% of U.S. population will be
obese. Using nonlinear regression models, Finklestein EA et al. (2012) estimate
the overall obesity prevalence rate to reach 42% by 2030
– According to the National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health
Promotion (CDC), cardiovascular diseases and diabetes were, respectively,
the 1st and 7th leading causes of death in the U.S. in 2015 and 2016
– In 2015, CDC estimated 30.3 million people – 9.4% of the U.S. population –
had diabetes. Of these 30.3 million people, 7.2 million (23.8%) were not
aware of or did not report having diabetes
– According to the Institute for Alternative Futures’ projections, in 2030 the
total number of people suffering from diabetes will reach 54.9 Million (13.9%
of the U. S. population). Annual deaths are projected to climb by 38% to
385,800; and total annual medical and societal costs related to diabetes will
increase 53% to more than $622 billion by 2030
31%
40%
14%
19%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Obesity Prevalence Rates
Adults Youth
39.6 37.9 41.135.7 34.8 36.5
42.8 40.8 44.741 38.5 43.1
0
50
Total Men Women
Prevalence rates (%) among adults aged 20 and over, by sex 
and age: United States, 2016
20 and over 20 - 39 40 - 59 60 and over
2016 2015
Rank
Percentage of total 
deaths
Cardiovascular diseases 1 23.10% 23.40%
Malignant neoplasms 2 21.80% 22.00%
Accidents (unintentional injuries 3 5.90% 5.40%
Chronic lowe respiratory diseases 4 5.60% 5.70%
Cerebrovascular diseases 5 5.20% 5.20%
Alzheimer's disease 6 4.20% 4.10%
Diabetes mellitus 7 2.90% 2.90%
Influenza and pneumonia 8 1.90% 2.10%
Nephritis, nephrotic syndrome and nephrosis 9 1.80% 1.80%
Intentional self-harm (suicide) 10 1.60% 1.60%
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Attachment 3 – Market Growth Drivers (1/2)
Attitude towards weight management and  healthier living
– According to Gallup market
research, between 50% and
60% of U.S. adults would like
to lose weight and between
30% and 40% would like to
stay at their present weight
– Although evidence suggests
that the U.S. weight loss &
management market is
sizable, it does not support
the popular belief that
consumer interest in weight
management has increased
significantly in recent years
– Furthermore, GfK MRI’s “The
Survey of the American
Consumer” indicates that
consumer interest in health
& wellness, particularly
healthier living have not
materially changed over the
2013-2017 period
– Real personal disposable income is defined as the post-tax and
benefit income available after an adjustment has been made for
inflation
– Changes in real disposable income are thought to have a strong
relationship over time with the level of consumer spending on
goods and services
– Data shows that real disposable income on a per capita basis has
been increasing consistently since 2000
– As mentioned before, considering the 2013-2017 period, real
disposable income per capita has risen from $39,763 to $42,791,
which corresponds to a 9.7% increase
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Attachment 3 – Market Growth Drivers (2/2)
WW offers 3 program
types (all of them give
access to the app):
Digital/OnlinePlus
Plan ($19.9/month) is
limited to access to the
app; Meetings ($44.95/
month) additionally
includes weekly group
meetings with Leaders’
guidance; and Coaching
($54.95/month)
encompasses phone
sessions with a
dedicated coach, and
personalized plans. A
$20 starter fee is
required. Its products
are cheaper vs.
Herbalife, and ready
meals in retail shops are
fairly cheap
Performance levels
Price Concept broadness Convenience Efficacy
WW is often described
as a company that
basically provides
weight-loss
programs (either in-
person meetings or
online subscriptions).
It doesn’t directly
deliver pre-prepared
meals (these can be
found in retail stores),
despite having an
online shop with food
& beverages offering.
Its app includes
healthy recipes,
exercise and calories
tracking and the
Community feature but
does not comprise
workout plans or
exercises database
WW does not deliver
ready meals at home,
which is less
convenient but allows
for more flexibility.
However, its app and
programs are
described as easy to
use and very
functional. The
SmartPoints system is
very complete (rates
many ingredients) and
allows for flexibility,
while still pursuing a
tailored goal. The wide
network of meeting
centers and the
Community feature
are also tools to make
the process easier for
its clients
Weight Watchers is
one of the few
commercial weight-
loss programs whose
ability to deliver has
been repeatedly
proven by clinical
studies, even though
Leaders are not
certified. Its programs
are considered more
efficient for weight-
loss, sugar control and
body fat than brief
advice or self-help
materials. In 2018,
WW ranked 1st for
“Best Weight-Loss
Diet”, “Best
Commercial Diet Plan”
and “Best Fast
Weight-Loss Diet” in
the US1
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Attachment 4 – Competition Analysis (1/4)
Many apps/websites
are free or offered at
a low subscription
price (e.g., Fitness Pal
has a $9.99 premium
subscription). Books
and magazines related
to healthy habits, food
and exercise are also
relatively cheap
Downloading an app
and buying a
book/magazine is
practical and
accessible by almost
everyone. These
resources can guide
self-training, even
though still requiring
physical effort
Self-help materials
can deliver short
term results but
there is lack of
evidence that they
help sustain a weight
loss trajectory or a
healthy lifestyle in the
long run1
Self-help materials There is a huge
variety of resources
providing healthy
recipes, calories
consumption tracking,
exercise tracking or
workout plans, but
very few of them
aggregate all of
these features
Meal replacement
programs are priced
around $300/month,
but replace groceries
expenses for their
clients
These are also very
weight-loss-focused
programs, not fully
integrated in health &
wellness. If we look at
their apps, the focus is
only on calories
consumption, goal
tracking and dieting
Home delivery of
self-made meals or
shakes makes it very
convenient. Clients
can decide from a
fairly big variety of
meals and order
online or by phone
Many studies prove
the efficacy of meal
replacement weight-
loss programs as it is
difficult to escape
from prepared
healthy meals
Other commercial 
weight-loss programs
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Attachment 4 – Competition Analysis (2/4)
Performance levels
Price Concept broadness Convenience Efficacy
Having a monthly
appointment with a
doctor or nutritionist
to set up and follow
up on a diet plan can
have very distinct
prices, ranging from
$30/month to
$200/month
Nutritionists will give
advice on how food
and nutrition affect
someone’s health. A
diet plan is designed
for each person but
this plan does not
have an integrated
approach to lifestyle,
being focused on diet
Usually these
appointments are
hosted on a monthly
or trimester basis, so
there is no frequent
goal tracking and
there is less
flexibility when
compared to
online/commercial
programs
These doctors or
nutritionists offer
professional advice
and design
personalized diet
plans, which
statistically and
clinically result in
weight loss
Doctors/ nutritionists
Subscriptions in
fitness centers depend
on the services
offered, but its prices
usually range
between $25/month
and $60/month, to
which an initiation fee
of around is added
Fitness centers offer a
huge variety of
fitness programs
(from lifting to group
dance/ yoga/workout
classes). Usually gyms
do not offer diet
plans, being
associated to a broad
lifestyle concept
Usually big fitness
centers chains have a
wide network of
gyms, which makes it
easy for someone to
find one nearby.
Results require big
physical effort and
energy
Exercise is
recommended by
public health agencies
for weight loss
because it has proven
results of helping in
weight control and
living a healthier
lifestyle
Fitness centers
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Attachment 4 – Competition Analysis (3/4)
Performance levels
Price Concept broadness Convenience Efficacy
Attachment 4 – Competition Analysis (4/4)
Depending on the
type of surgery, a
bariatric surgery costs
between $15,000
and $25,000. In
addition, this type of
surgery is not
considered to reduce
overall health care
costs in the long run 1
This procedure
usually aims at
improving physical
appearance and
improving health
conditions (e.g.,
diabetes and blood
pressure). It does not
change someone’s
diet or incentivises a
healthier lifestyle
This type of surgery is
only recommended to
people with very high
levels of body mass
index. No major
physical efforts is
required, but
recovery period
takes a few weeks,
people tend to avoid
invasive surgeries
It does not replace
good habits but makes
it easier to cut on
calories and to be
more active. Some
people regain weight
after surgery and
gastrointestinal snags
may appear but
results are
significant enough 2
Surgical procedures
Usually pills or
supplements are sold
in packages, costing
around $60/month,
reducing the expenses
with food for the
client. Herbalife’s
shakes kits can range
from $50/month to
$150/month
These are weight-
loss-only methods
(do not exactly
stimulate and
promote healthier
lifestyles), that usually
reduce appetite,
reduce fat absorption
or increase fat
burning
These products do
not require much
physical effort from
the customer and can
be acquired online in
retail websites,
pharma platforms or
even in multi-level
marketers
There is lack of
scientific proof that
taking pills reduces
weight for itself,
without a change in
dietary habits. This
weight-loss method
has some frequency
of side effects
Supplements/ diet 
pills/ shakes
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Performance levels
Price Concept broadness Convenience Efficacy
Contrarily to conventional wisdom, a disproportionate share of
middle-aged consumers – 45 to 64 years –are shopping online.
Looking at revenues per shopper, generate Millennials –
consumers aged 18 to 34 – are the key age demographic for
online commerce, spending more money online in a given year
than any other age group. According to BI Intelligence research,
consumers in this age group spend, on average, $2,000 per
annum on e-commerce, despite having lower incomes than older
adults
18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
% of Online Shoppers 0.076 0.186 0.231 0.24 0.164 0.103
% of US Population 0.098 0.184 0.179 0.197 0.17 0.186
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
Online Shoppers by Age Group
% of Online Shoppers % of US Population
MenWomen younger than  35
Although the prevalence of overweight and obesity are nearly equal among men
and women in the US, men account for only 27% of people who participate in
behavioural weight loss programmers
Why are participation rates lower among men?
Studies indicate the low participation rates among men can be attributed to a
mismatch between men's preferences and what the programmes offer: men
perceive weight loss programs as feminine and as being targeted at women
What do men seek in a weight management programme?
Men report wanting individually focused programs that do not include strict
meal plans and provide the ability to tailor the diet to their preferences.
Additionally, they prefer programs that do not disrupt their daily routine and
provide information in a clear and direct manner
39.6 37.9 41.135.7 34.8 36.5
42.8 40.8 44.741 38.5 43.1
0
50
Total Men Women
Prevalence rates (%) among adults aged 20 and over, by sex and age: 
United States, 2016
20 and over 20 - 39 40 - 59 60 and over
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Attachment 5 – Indicators non-core demographics
Sufficient evidence for weight 
change 
Limited evidence for weight 
change 
Sufficient evidence for behavior 
change
Limited evidence for behavior 
change
Logic based on parallel evidence
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Portion Control
– In developed economies, the toll of obesity on healthcare systems is between 2% and 7% of all healthcare spending. This figure does not include the large cost of treating
associated diseases such as type 2 diabetes and heart disease, which would take the healthcare cost toll up to 20%
– McKinsey & Co estimates the global economic impact from obesity – which encompasses the loss of productive life, direct healthcare costs, and investment to mitigate the
costs – to be roughly $2.0tn (2012 PPP dollars), or 2.8% of global GDP . In the US, obesity generated an impact of $663bn a year in 2012, or 4.1% of GDP
– Finkelstein et al (2010) estimate the annual cost to employers attributable to obesity among full-time employees, in the US, to be $73.1bn. This figure contemplates not only
medical expenses, which amount to $30.3bn, but also the costs associated with absenteeism ($12.8bn) and lower productivity ($30bn)
– McKinsey & Company’s research indicates that weight-management programs are among the most impactful and cost-efficient strategies to reduce obesity
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Trend
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Attachment 6 – Obesity burden to employers
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Portion Control
Reformulation
High calorie food/ beverage availabity
Weight-management programs
Parental education
School curriculum
Healthy meals
Surgery
Labeling
Price promotions
Pharmaceuticals
Media restrictions
10% tax on high-sugar/ high-fat products
Workplace wellness
Active transport
Public health campaigns
Attachment 7 – Alternative scenario to Nutrisystem’s acquisition: ready meals
commercialization under a licensing agreement with a leading HW ready meals player
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2020 2021 2022 2023
Contribution to EBITDA ($ mn)
Contribution to EBITDA from non-WW users
 Contribution to EBITDA from WW users
WW ready meals contribution to EBITDA is forecasted to amount to
$18.5mn in 2020, reaching $28.9mn in 2023. Since the meals will be
commercialized on the mass market, they will be purchased by both
WW users and non-WW users
Contribution to EBITDA from WW users’ purchases was estimated
assuming:
– 10% of WW subscribers in the US will purchase WW ready meals
in 2020. This proportion will increase 10% per year from 2020
to 2023
– The average annual expenditure on WW ready meals per
customer will be equal to $200 and will remain stable over the
forecast period
Contribution to EBITDA from non-WW users’ purchases was
estimated assuming:
– WW will be able to reach 1% of the US population (excluding
WW users) in 2020. This proportion will increase 10% per year
from 2020 to 2023
– Annual expenditure on WW ready meals per consumer will be
equal to the annual expenditure on HW ready meals per capita in
the US forecasted by Euromonitor
The royalty fee corresponds to 8% of sales, a value which is
comprised within the typical 6%-10% range
EBITDA projections (FY20 - FY23) Returns & Value Creation
Under this scenario, the fund is expected to have a money multiple return of 2.69 in a 5-year horizon
(2023), corresponding to an IRR of 22%. Nonetheless, keeping the investment for 7 years (2025) would
yield returns of 3.21 (assuming similar financing conditions in 2024)
Under this scenario, total value creation will amount to ~$6.7bn, which corresponds to a 185% 
increase  in Equity Value: 
– No multiple arbitrage is assumed (i.e., exit multiple = entry multiple)
– Revenue growth will be the major driver of value creation, being mostly sustained by high 
acquisition rates and  improved retention in the B2C segment
– EBITDA margin will expand, as a result of the strong growth of the higher margin online business 
and the licensing agreement, being the 2nd most relevant value driver
– Cash will generates additional value due to significantly positive CFs over the holding period 
which will allow for deleveraging
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Entry EV Exit EV (2023) - Alternative Case
Sweet Equity 88 815
Institutional Ords 498 4,621
FRI 3,001 4,785
Net Debt 2,064 148
0
7,000
14,000 EV breakdown evolution ($ mn)
Meal kits’ potential contribution to revenues is forecasted to amount to $3.64mn in 2020, reaching
$5.67mn in 2023. Since costs associated with the licensing agreement are negligible/inexistent, the
contribution to EBITDA will be equal to the contribution to revenues
Projections rely on the following assumptions:
– 3% of WW users in the US will subscribe the service in 2020. This proportion will increase by
10% per year from 2020 to 2023
– The average annual expenditure per WW user who subscribes the service will be equal to the
average of Blue Apron and Hello Fresh’s annual expenditure per subscriber
– The royalty fee will correspond to 8% of sales, a value which is comprised within the typical
6%-10% range
Meal kits (licensing agreement) – Projections (FY20 to FY23)
Attachment 8 – Meal kits under a licensing agreement with a leading player  
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Attachment 9 – Nutrisystem’s Valuation
EV/EBITDA 2018
57
Through-the-cycle EV/(EBITDA – CSE)
- The median EV/EBITDA for direct competitors
registers a median of 12.6x (implying an EV of
$1,419mn) and for other comparables the
median multiple is 10.9x (EV of $1,228mn)
- The 5Y median predicts an EV of $1,286mn and
the 2Y median implies an EV of $1,464mn
Regression
- Historical revenue growth predicts an
EV/EBITDA should be 12x (implying an EV of
$1,245mn) and forecasted revenue growth
indicates a multiple of 14.2x (EV of $1,473mn)
0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500
Nutrisystem - EV/(EBITDA - CSE)  (3Y)
Direct trading comps - EV/(EBITDA - CSE) (2Y)
Direct trading comps - EV/(EBITDA - CSE) (5Y)
Trading comps - Regression Analysis
Other trading comps - EV/EBITDA 2018e
Direct trading comps - EV/EBITDA 2018e
Enterprise Value ($ mn)
$1,341mn
– Nutrisystem would be acquired by $1,341mn, based on a 12.9x EV/(EBITDA-
CSE) multiple, which corresponds to a 11.9x EV/EBITDA multiple
– This transaction represents a 12% premium over the 31/12/2018 EV of the
company
– The deal will result in a multiple accretion due to the acquisition of
Nutrisystem at a lower multiple than the one of Weight Watchers at exit (12.9x
vs. 13.5x), resulting in a multiple accretion gain of $40.5mn
– Sensitivity analysis on the acquisition multiple can be found in slide 37
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Attachment 10 – Debt Market Overview
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Bond Market Conditions
– Looking at the coupon rates on bonds issued in USD, with similar
maturities (4 to 6 years) and across ratings, it is easy to conclude that
most bonds have coupons between 6 and 8 percent, annually
– USD denominated senior unsecured fixed rate bonds issued by US
companies rated between B- and B+ yields have recently increased from 6 to
7.5 percent, mainly due to higher risk related to trade wars and the expected
interest rate hike by the Federal Reserve
– Although this implies that credit conditions are not as favourable as they
were 6 to 12 months ago, the new business plan and company control is
expected to stimulate credit appetite on investors and create better
financing conditions for WW’s LBO, through an increase in rating from B
to B+, corroborated by the Altman Z-score of 5.36 and the BNP Paribas
Leveraged Finance Team
Credit Spreads on Loans
– Based on term loans with similar rating (B+), currency and maturity, and in
accordance with BNP Paribas Leveraged Finance Team estimates, the LBO
can be funded through a Term Loan paying 400 bps
WW EV Fluctuation
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WW End of the Period Subscribers Growth
⎼ WW’s EV fluctuation is directly correlated with both top-line and end of the period subscribers growth. Once these two variables showed significant signs of
acceleration, WW’s EV increased. On the other hand, after ten consecutive periods of top-line growth and eleven periods of end of the period subscribers growth, the Q2’18
disappointing results lead to a drop in WW’s EV
⎼ During 2016 and the beginning of 2017, WW’s EV traded at
reasonably stable EV, of around $3,000mn
⎼ After that, and due to positive growth indicators in the upcoming
periods, WW’s EV increased significantly, reaching the $8,492mn
mark right before 2Q18 results
⎼ Since then, WW’s EV has been falling, trading at $4,102mn in the
last day of the year
⎼ Right now, it is believed that there is a timing opportunity to
acquire WW
⎼ First, the current EV levels were only last seen in 2Q17, a
period in which both top-line and end of the period subscribers
growth were bellow the current ones
⎼ Secondly, it is believed that the investors’ negative sentiment
on WW does not reflect the forecasted growth generated from
the fund strategies, which will be implemented once WW is
acquired
Attachment 11 – WW’s EV and subscriber/revenue growth correlation
– Considering the established criteria, 3 possible target buyers with strong potential were identified – Nestlé, Kraft Heinz and Unilever. Besides having operations within the
Global Healthy Eating, Nutrition & Weight Loss market, which could give rise to synergies, these fast-moving consumer goods giants have a strong track record of acquisitions
and other investments in the field, are financially sound and have Asset Management or PE companies among its leading shareholders, which could back the acquisition
– 4 additional companies, which did not meet all the criteria defined, – Procter & Gamble, Danone, General Mills and Amazon – were also analyzed in extent
Criteria for selecting potential target buyers
Related Business
Size & Financial Strength
Previous investments
Given WW’s size at the time of exit, which will be substantially higher than the size of its competitors, it is extremely
unlikely that the company will be acquired by another weight-management services provider. In order for synergies to
occur, potential buyers where selected considering the leading players which have operations within the Global Healthy
Eating, Nutrition & Weight Loss market, a broad definition of WW’s TAM
Given the significant investment which will be necessary to acquire WW, only companies with an EV higher than $25bn
(twice the size of WW by 2023) were considered in the analysis
Furthermore, both financial strength indicators, in particular the debt-to equity ratio, and the presence of major
leading institutional investors such as Asset Management or PE firms – which could help fund the operation –
among the companies leading shareholders
Lastly, acquisitions during the 2016-2018 triennium were examined, in order to find if the potential buyers had bought
companies that operate in the Global Healthy Eating, Nutrition & Weight Loss market. The existence of large deals in
recent years supports the hypothesis that the companies could be interested in acquiring WW
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Company Company Profile Size & Financial Relevant deals  in the H&W market Assessment
Unilever is a leading player in the CPG industry.
The company’s offer comprises branded and
packaged goods, primarily foods, detergents,
home care and personal products, which are
sold in ~190 countries. Faced with increasing
competition, Unilever has been loosing market
share in several product categories comprised
in the Global Healthy Eating, Nutrition & Weight
Loss market
D/E: 2.55 (vs. industry’s D/E
0.17)
Largest Shareholders: The
Leverhulme Trust (4.19%),
BlackRock Investment
Management (2.96%) and The
Vanguard Group (2.84%)
Acquisitions since 2015:
– GSK FHD (deal size: $3.8bn) – Health Food
Drinks portfolio, which comprises brands such
as Horlicks
– Mãe Terra (deal size: not disclosed) – Provider
of natural and organic food
Other investments: In 2017, Unilever Ventures
acquired a stake in Sun Basket, a healthy and
organic meal-kit startup
Nestlé is the largest food and beverage company
in the world. The company’s offer comprises
water coffee, milk products and ice cream,
nutrition and health science, prepared dishes and
cooking aids, confectionery, and pet care, which
are sold in ~190 countries. In recent years,
Nestlé has shifted its focus towards natural,
organic and healthy product categories
Acquisitions since 2015:
– Atrium (deal size: $2.3bn) - manufacturer of
nutritional health products
– Terrafertil (deal size: not disclosed) – seller of
natural, organic, plant-based foods and healthy
snacks
Other investments: In 2017, Nestlé acquired a
minority stake in Freshly, a meal-kits startup
D/E: 0.63 (vs. industry’s D/E
0.52)
Largest Shareholders: Nestlé SA
(3.04%), The Vanguard Group
(2.70%), Norges Bank Investment
Management (2.43%)
Kraft Heinz is a leading player in the food and
beverage industry. The company’s offer
comprises condiments and sauces, cheese and
dairy, meals, meats, refreshment beverages,
coffee and other grocery products, which are
sold in ~200 countries. In line with the health,
Kraft Heinz announced the launch of
Springboard Brands, a incubator program for
natural and organic food brands
D/E: 0.53 (vs. industry’s D/E
0.51)
Largest Shareloders: Berkshire
Hathaway (26.7%), 3G Capital
Partners (22.1%) and The
Vanguard Group (3.74%)
Acquisitions since 2015:
– Primal Kitchen (deal size: $200mn) –maker of
“better-for-you” condiments, sauces and salad
dressings
Note: In 2017, Kraft Heinz made a unsuccessful
$143bn approach to take over Unilever
EV: €286bn
EV: $89bn
EV: $179bn
* Largest shareholders – relevant institutional investors such as PE or Asset Management firms are highlighted in green
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Company Company Profile Size & Financial Relevant deals  in the H&W market Assessment
Procter & Gamble is a leading player in the CPG
industry. Although its offer relies predominantly
on consumer health, and personal care and
hygiene products, it also comprises various food
and beverage product categories, which are sold
in ~180 countries
Acquisitions since 2015:
– Merck Consumer Health (deal size: $4.2bn) -
manufacturer of over-the-counter products,
including cough and cold remedies, diet
supplements, everyday health supplements,
and women's and children´s health products
D/E: 0.57 (vs. Industry’s D/E 0.3)
Largest Shareholders: The
Vanguard Group (7.41%), SSgA
Funds Management (4.48%) and
BlackRock Fund Advisors (4.38%)
Leading player in the CPG industry. General Mills’
offer includes ready-to-eat cereal, convenient
meals, ethnic meals, pizza, soup, frozen breakfast
and frozen entrees, and snacks
General Mills did not acquire any company which
operates within the Global Healthy Eating,
Nutrition & Weight Loss market, in the 2015-2018
period.
In 2018, General Mills acquired Blue Buffalo, a pet
food manufacturer, for $8bn
D/E: 2.58 (vs. Industry’s D/E
0.51)
Largest Shareholders: The
Vanguard Group (7.25%), SSgA
Funds Management (5.68%) and
BlackRock Fund Advisors
(4.81%)
Danone is a leading food-processing group.
Danone’s offer comprises diary-products, plant-
based products, baby foods, biscuit and cereals,
bottled water and medical nutrition products,
which are sold ~120 countries
Acquisitions since 2015:
– WhiteWave Foods (deal size $12.5bn) – CPG
company, which manufactured, marketed,
distributed, and sold branded plant-based
foods and beverages (2016)
D/E: 1.24 (vs. Industry’s D/E
0.52)
Largest Shareholders: Danone
SA (5.59%), Massachusetts
Financial Services Co. (2.48%)
and The Vanguard Group (2.34%)
Amazon is a multinational technology company
which focuses on e-commerce, cloud computing,
and artificial intelligence. The company is the
largest e-commerce marketplace and cloud
computing platform in the world as measured by
revenue and market capitalization. The company
has recently the healthy food market, through
the acquisition of Whole Foods Market.
Acquisitions since 2015:
– Whole Foods Market (deal size $13.7bn) –
American supermarket chain which sells only
products free from artificial colors, flavors,
preservatives, sweeteners and hydrogenated
fats
D/E: 0.33 (vs. Industry’s D/E
0.83)
Largest Shareholders: Jeff Bezos
(16.1%), The Vanguard Group
(5.93%) and Fidelity
Management & Research (3.48%)
EV: €54bn
EV: $39bn
EV: $262bn
EV: €740bn
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Post-IPO performance of
recent transactions
Regulatory Windows
Sector performance
IPO pipeline
Funding needs
Market
Volatility
IPO candidate’s life cycle
Macroeconomic
conditions
Economic cycle
Valuation level
Short-term Mid-term Long-term
IPO Timing
The window of opportunity for an IPO is difficult to predict, being dependent on
variables such as political developments, interest rates, inflation and economic
forecast – other key variables are described on the chart bellow.
To determine the most adequate timing for an IPO, both hard and soft indicators
are examined. Hard key indicators for positive IPO sentiment include the valuation
of the peer group and the volatility on capital markets measuring the risk, whereas
soft factors to consider include investors’ sentiment as determined by the level of
trading volume or velocity and the after-IPO performance of recent IPOs
Criteria used by IPO investors to make investment decisions
IPO which affect IPO timing
Research indicates investors give a 60/40% weighting to financial/ non-financial
metrics when making IPO investment decisions
Among financial factors, EY highlights debt to equity ratios, EPS growth, sales growth,
ROE, profitability and EBITDA growth as being the most relevant indicators for
investors
Among non-financial factors, EY highlights quality of management, corporate strategy
and execution, brand strength and operational effectiveness, and corporate
governance
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Most important non-financial IPO success factors to investors
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Note: % represents the percentage of institutional investors that had the particular factor as one of their top five choices
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In spite of market volatility, US IPO
activity saw 191 IPOs (>$50mn market
cap) raising a total of US$46.8b in
2018, a Y-o-Y increase of 19% in
volume terms and 32% in value terms
Healthcare (76 offerings, $9.1bn
raised) and technology (52 offerings,
$18.1bn raised) continued to be
dominant sectors in the US exchanges
in 2018 both in deal number and
proceeds
26 unicorns (with total proceeds of
US$15.0b) went public in 2018, a
trend which is expected to continue into
2019
US exchanges remained the
preferred destination for foreign
companies. Cross-border IPOs
accounted for 31% of US IPOs, with 60
companies from 15 different countries
choosing to list in the US during 2018
Positive post-IPO price performance
is keeping investors engaged and
encouraging more IPO candidates to
go public. In 2018, US IPOs have posted
average first-day returns of ~15.1%
and average current share price post-
IPO (by Dec. 5) of 11%
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Real Estate (5)
Health Care (76)
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Communicatins services (1)
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Industrials (9)
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2018 Overview 2018 Key Figures
Currency
Stronger
regulatory
requirements
Economic
growth
Geopolitical
tensions
Brexit
Oil Prices
Interest rate hikes
Short-term
volatility
Implications from
changes in US 
trade policies
2019 Outlook 
Key factors which can influence investor
sentiment for IPOs in 2019
According to EY research, solid performance in 2018
creates a supportive backdrop for continued US IPO
activity in 2019
Technology, healthcare, consumer products and industrials
are expected to remain the most active sectors as investors
look to balance high returns potential, with more
traditional, less risky investments. Focusing on the tech
sector, several decacorns (Uber, Airbnb, Pinterest and Lyft)
are expected to go public during 2019
Nevertheless, the decline in quarter-over-quarter IPO
activity across all regions in 4Q18 sends signals for a
cautious start in 2019
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Company Size and Investment Criteria Industry Focus Relevant Deals
Private Equity AUM: $142bn
Typically invests up to $700mn in
companies with EV ranging from
$500mn to $2.4bn
Assessment
Consortium: $45bn acquisition of TXU
Corp. (KKR & Co, TPG and Goldman Sachs
Capital Partners)
Single Buyer Purchase: $29bn
acquisition of First Data Corp.
Private Equity AUM: $126.2bn
Typically invests between $100mn
and $1.25bn, but it also considers
both smaller and larger transactions
in companies with EV above $500 mn
Private Equity AUM: $66bn
Typically invests between $10mn
and $1bn in companies with an EV
ranging between $300mn and $3bn
Private Equity AUM: $2.6bn
Typically invests between $10mn an
$75mn in companies with an EV
ranging from $25mn to $250mn
Private Equity AUM: $650mn
Targets companies with EV ranging
between $50mn and $500mn
Consortium: $27 bnacquisition of Caesars
Entertainment Corporation (TPG, Apollo
and Axa)
Single Buyer Purchase: $2.25bn
acquisition of RCN Telecom Services
Consortium: $20bn acquisition of
Thomson Reuters Financial and Risk
Business (Blackstone, GIC Pte Ltd and
CPPIB)
Single Buyer Purchase: $4.3bn
acquisition of AON HR BPO platform
In 2013, North Castle Partners acquired
Jenny Craig, for an undisclosed amount
(estimated to be bellow $600mn)
In 2016, Sentinel Capital Partners
acquired Quick Weight Loss Centers, a
provider of weight loss services. The terms
of the agreement were not disclosed
KKR’s core industries in the US: industrials,
financial services, retail & consumer,
energy, technology, media &
entertainment, healthcare and hospitality
& leisure
No particular industry focus. Blackstone
funds cover several industries, including
financial services; consumer & retail;
healthcare; and energy
TPG holds investments across several
sectors. It is important to highlight the
recent investments in wellness industry,
having acquired several gym operators
Lower midmarket companies operating
in various industries, including consumer
discretionary, healthcare products and
services, and consumer staples
Small-cap middle market consumer
businesses in personal care, consumer
health, sports and fitness, weight
management, and nutrition
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